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Abstract 
 Mitigating climate change is recognized as an increasingly urgent task that requires 
several different methods to achieve.  Among these is the need to encourage voluntary behaviour 
change.  Doing so necessitates an understanding of the barriers that prevent behaviour change, 
including those which are psychological.  Among the psychological barriers to change are 
perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma.  This thesis takes a mixed method 
approach to understand importance of these in relation to both each other and other barriers when 
taking action to mitigate climate change.  Results indicate that individuals do not clearly 
distinguish climate change from general environmental problems and have a tendency to simplify 
the issues to that considered to be the singularly most important.  Powerlessness and the 
commons dilemma had been evaluated but not extensively or as specifically applicable to climate 
change.  Powerlessness and the commons dilemma were both found to relate to lower amounts of 
action on climate change and less importance placed upon climate change in actions.  Perceived 
risk and human influence on climate change were the strongest predictors of action.   Results 
generally support the knowledge-deficit model of behaviour change as being applicable to 
climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
A wicked problem is one which has no clear or easy solution, and also involves 
uncertainties and the need for change across many levels of society (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
Climate change is considered by many a wicked problem (Eliot et al., 1999; Ludwig, 2001).  This 
is particularly apparent in the way in which it is pervasive throughout all activities of the 
economy from extraction and production to consumption and disposal.  This is unlike almost any 
other environmental problem before, given that the largest of these have typically been at either 
sub-global scales or by contrast the result of a relatively small number of outputs, products or 
processes.  Climate change differs from other environmental problems because it is influenced 
significantly by increases in CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are emitted by a wide range of 
human activities (Hegerl et al., 2007) and is a very long-lived problem with significant 
proportions of some of those greenhouse gases remaining in the atmosphere for thousands of 
years (Solomon et al., 2009).  These activities range from many forms of electricity generation 
(Sims et al., 2003) to the use of automobiles for transportation (He et al., 2005) as well as 
resulting from other processes such as deforestation (Fearnside & Laurance, 2004). The ties with 
energy generation in particular mean that the problem is connected to a huge number of the day 
to day actions that we, as individuals, take.  This adds up to a society-wide problem which will 
require many changes to the way individuals, households and organisations behave in order for it 
to be lessened and ultimately solved. 
The solution to climate change will depend on many different possible contributions that 
are offered by different people or groups.   As would be expected with such a widespread and 
diversely generated problem, the possible solutions also vary widely in both method and scale.  
The scale ranges from individual actions through to nation based approaches.  The suggested 
methods by which changes might occur range from a laissez faire approach, leaving all changes 
or adaptations to the market’s ‘invisible hand’ as actors in the economy seek to maximise utility 
or profits (Greenspan, 2007), to a wide-ranging state-enforced reshaping of society and the 
economy using regulation to make changes (Monbiot, 2006).  It is likely that a solution to climate 
change will fall in between the two extremes and an increase in pro-environmental behaviour will 
involve some mix of regulation, technological advances and voluntary behaviour change (Romm, 
2008).  Therefore understanding each of these options is of importance. At this point in time 
voluntary behaviour change is probably the least understood.  Voluntary behaviour change is 
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often frustrated by a sense of powerlessness which may or may not be associated with a 
perception on people’s part that they face a commons dilemma.  There is some evidence that 
these barriers are very important in a climate change context so this thesis examines these. 
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2. Aim, Objectives and Outline 
2.1 Aim 
To evaluate the importance of and relationships among perceptions of powerlessness and 
the commons dilemma in relation to climate change.  Identify any other related perceptions with 
strong relationships to climate change mitigating behaviour. 
2.2 Objectives 
 
1 – Review literature on environmental behaviour focussing on the current understanding 
of powerlessness, the commons dilemma and related perceptions regarding environmental 
problems, in particular climate change. 
2 – Collect qualitative and quantitative data on perceptions of powerlessness and the 
commons dilemma in relation to climate change. 
3 – Report results and analyse data in relation to hypotheses  
4 – Discuss findings about the importance and causes of powerlessness and the common 
dilemma in relation to climate change 
5 – Accept or challenge hypotheses. Draw conclusions on hypotheses 
 
2.3 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis examines two closely related psychological phenomena, powerlessness and the 
commons dilemma in relation to climate change. The two phenomena have similar causes, 
similar effects and interact with each other in such a manner that were this thesis to cover only 
one, an incomplete picture would be presented.   The research, within reason, should be 
applicable to other similar environmental problems involving the provision of public goods.   
This thesis initially covers the available scientific literature on behaviour change in 
chapter 3.  Chapter 4 provides a review of the scientific literature on powerlessness and the 
commons dilemma in order to understand and inform further research and discussion.  Chapter 5 
gives an overview of gaps in current understanding and sets out the hypotheses to be tested in the 
course of this research.  The methods of primary data collection are then detailed in chapter 6.  
Mixed method data collection was used so there is a summary of both focus group and survey 
methods.  In chapter 7 the results of both methods of data collection are presented.  Chapter 8 is 
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the discussion of these results and in chapter 9 the conclusions are presented.  Chapter 10 covers 
the limitations of this research and outlines directions for further research. 
 
Figure 1 Outline of Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
3. Behaviour Change 
3.1 Pro-environmental Behaviour and Intent 
Depending upon their attitudes, beliefs and values individuals have pro-environmental 
intentions.  Such intentions are formed at a range of scales but can be broadly defined as a desire 
to decrease or minimise harm done to the natural environment (Stern, 2000). However, pro-
environmental intent does not necessarily lead to pro-environmental behaviour.  Intent is one 
variable amongst a host of others that influence whether or not individuals will carry out pro-
environmental behaviours. Pro-environmental behaviours are actions carried out with the 
intention of benefitting the environment and any solution to climate change will necessarily 
involve increasing the occurrence of this type of behaviour.  There are three key means by which 
pro-environmental behaviour occurs, is enabled or encouraged by relevant actors.  They are 
regulation, technological advance and voluntary behaviour change. These are now examined in 
more detail. 
 
3.2 Behaviour Change 
Behaviour change is any modification to the actions of an individual.  In this research 
behaviour change will refer to modifications to behaviour undertaken with the intent of reducing 
the contribution of an individual to climate change, unless otherwise specified. This does not 
mean that all behaviour change will necessarily result in a lessening of impact (Stern, 2000).  For 
this research three broad categories of drivers of behaviour change are considered, based around 
the means by which behaviour change either occurs or is encouraged. 
 
3.3 Regulation and Technological Advance 
3.3.1 Regulation 
Regulation refers to causes of behaviour change based upon legal frameworks.  They 
commonly take the form of a ban on harmful actions or products, or the creation of economic 
incentives to change such as taxes, fines or subsidies.  These types of measures have been used 
for certain environmental problems in the past with positive results.  For instance the Montreal 
Protocol banned the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as a refrigerant and propellant in aerosol 
cans due to the gases’ damaging effects upon the ozone hole. This legislation resulted in a 
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levelling off and then decreases of the pollutant (N.O.A.A., 2006).  The sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading scheme set up to curb discharge of that pollutant in the U.S.A. used regulation 
to implement a market based approach and is regarded as a success following significant 
reductions in the level of the pollutant in the environment (Burtraw et al., 2005).  
CO2 emissions have two key characteristics that make the application of similar measures 
more difficult than in other cases involving environmentally damaging emissions.  These stem 
from CO2’s ubiquity as an output of diverse processes throughout the economy.  The banning, by 
regulation, of CFCs was relatively easy due to the ability to replace the harmful gases with more 
environmentally friendly alternatives, something not able to be done with CO2 due in part to 
CO2’s primary role as an output rather than input of industrial processes (EPA, 2008).  The 
U.S.A.’s sulphur dioxide trading scheme involved a comparatively small number of large point 
source polluters, quite unlike the huge number of dispersed and varied polluters emitting CO2 
pervading all stages of the economy from production to consumption.  For instance the U.S.A.’s 
sulphur dioxide trading scheme was comprehensive in its coverage yet only involved 
approximately 3000 emitters whilst the European Union’s non-comprehensive CO2 trading 
scheme covering only large polluters within the Union encompasses already some 11,000 
emitters (Stauffer, 2008). 
Assuming that the aforementioned problems of using regulation to reduce emissions of a 
pollutant with characteristics such as CO2 are overcome, there still remain other issues with the 
method.  Regulation, particularly which penalises or prohibits certain behaviours, is often 
inefficient or undesirable from an economic perspective.  This is because bans often limit 
innovation (Hemmelskamp, 1997) or lead to behaviour that represents an inefficient use of 
resources. This occurs, for example, when fishing is limited by means of a season. Fishing 
vessels lie at anchor unused for most of the year and harvest very intensively during the season 
(Waters, 1991).  Furthermore, regulation of this type can lead to significant opposition, making it 
difficult for political agents to put the plan into action under a democratic system, especially if 
that system allows for effective protest by concerned groups. The New Zealand government’s 
proposed 2003 methane tax (labelled a fart tax by opponents) is an example of a proposed 
regulatory solution effectively blocked by protest (TVNZ, 2003).  Even if enacted, unpopularity 
can undermine implementation of a policy.  Again, the New Zealand government provides an 
example with the Emissions Trading Scheme, whose implementation, at least in regard to liquid 
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fuels, was delayed following rises in petrol costs (Ministry-for-Environment, 2008). Unpopularity 
of regulation is particularly important in a liberal market economy; extensive use of regulation 
can generate widespread resistance due to perceived government intrusion in people’s lives. 
The effectiveness of economic incentive based regulation, including taxes, subsidies and 
permits is also limited because decisions about environmentally harmful behaviour are not made 
in a social and cultural vacuum in which only economic considerations matter (Hinchliffe, 1996).  
These methods only act on one part of the motivations that determine individuals’ behaviour. 
Regulation therefore has a number of potential drawbacks.  It may be ineffective or 
impractical to implement in relation to climate change.  Even if these drawbacks are addressed it 
may still be inefficient.  In a democratic system regulation can raise opposition that even if 
limited in scope can be very vocal and consequently make certain measures hard to enact.  This 
does not mean regulation must be discarded entirely but merely that faith in it alone to find or 
foster a solution is not well placed.  However if the public response is inadequate over time to 
deal with the worsening problem of climate change, regulation is likely to become increasingly 
necessary in order to implement a rapid solution. 
 
3.3.2 Technological Advance 
Technological advance refers to change in behaviour as a result of improvements in the 
available methods and equipment used to carry out actions.  These encompass changes from a 
certain action to another, for instance improvements in internet capabilities allowing the use of 
telecommunications to ‘attend’ a conference as opposed to travelling to it, resulting in a decrease 
in emissions due to lowered energy use.  Or it can refer to changes in the way an action is carried 
out, for instance gains in efficiency which allow a manufacturing process to be carried out with 
less total energy input. 
When dealing with technological advance as a solution to climate change it is important 
to distinguish between views of technological advance as being the solution and viewing it as 
part of the solution.  When technological advance is advocated as the solution it usually implies a 
laissez faire approach that relies on improvements in science and technologies of production to 
produce goods and services more energy efficiently and cleanly, thus reducing the environmental 
harm, or a reliance on future technologies such as a system to capture greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere or cloud seeding and so on. Relying on this is based on the assumption that both 
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consumers and producers search for and create the most efficient technology in order to reduce 
costs and/or maximise profits and that this is sufficient to reduce emissions to a desired level. A 
high profile example of technological advance involving reductions in CO2 emissions is the 
popularity of ‘hybrid’ vehicles such as the Toyota Prius in recent years. 
However this approach is beset with problems.  For instance despite huge gains in 
efficiency in the relevant technologies over the previous century, CO2 emissions have continued 
to climb (Marland et al., 2007).  This is because growth in demand often outstrips or at best 
offsets gains in efficiency rather than actually resulting in a lowering of net emissions (Brookes, 
1990; Schipper & Grubb, 2000).  At the level of the individual consumer the rebound effect 
reduces the potential value of this solution (Binswanger, 2001; Greening et al., 2000).  This 
occurs when individuals make monetary savings due to efficiency, for example, saving on petrol 
per kilometre due to increased fuel economy of a new vehicle, but negate or decrease those gains 
by increasing consumption, for example driving further or spending the extra money on other 
activities that result in further emissions. 
Using technological advance as part of the solution however is quite different.  This is the 
notion that gains in efficiency are welcome but that they alone cannot act as a solution to climate 
change; instead technological advance must act alongside regulation (Brown et al., 1998) and 
voluntary behaviour change with the latter two also acting as drivers of advances in technology. 
 
3.4 Voluntary Behaviour Change 
In the context of this research ‘voluntary’ refers to behaviour change being undertaken of 
the individual’s own accord without the use of regulation to either constrain behaviour or provide 
economic incentives.  This does not mean that economic incentives to change do not exist.  But 
rather that those incentives exist because, for instance, new technology is cheaper due to lower 
running costs from greater energy efficiency as opposed to being cheaper due to subsidies or 
taxes reducing the economic appeal of alternatives.   This draws one to the need to distinguish 
voluntary behaviour change and technological advance.  Both are described as voluntary in the 
sense that they are not inherently encouraged or required by legislative means.  However 
technological advance covers only one aspect of change, that of taking up more efficient 
equipment and methods.  Voluntary behaviour change however is much broader in scope.  It 
covers not only the adoption of aforementioned technological changes but also changes from one 
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behaviour to another e.g. travelling by bus instead of a car to work, reducing some activities e.g. 
taking shorter showers and ceasing certain behaviours altogether e.g. international air travel.  
None of these examples should be considered technological advances. 
Voluntary behaviour change is a solution that in principle applies to both organisations 
and individuals, but in practice is most relevant at the micro level i.e. individuals and households.  
Voluntary behaviour change might be most effective with such low level and dispersed emitters 
of CO2 because of the relatively high initial expense of technological solutions in contrast to the 
availability and low cost of simple possibilities for change. Technological advance however is 
likely to be more appropriate for large point source emitters, e.g. industry such as electricity 
generation, for which a large expense associated with an upgrade such as emissions scrubbers is 
possible and voluntary change such as running generators for shorter periods is not an option, or 
at best, unlikely to take place. 
Common examples of voluntary behaviour change at the individual and household levels 
include switching from a standard electricity retailer to a ‘green’ one or taking public transport to 
work instead of driving a car, both of which lower energy demands and subsequently carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
3.5 Voluntary Behaviour Change in Combination with Technology and 
Regulation 
As with technological change it is naive to consider voluntary behaviour change capable 
of modifying all behaviour that affects climate change to sustainable patterns.  Instead it must 
play an important role alongside technological advances and legislative measures as a solution to 
climate change.  When coupled with technological advance, it can encourage the adoption of 
better technology, especially when economic incentives to change are weak or non-existent and 
help to prevent or reduce the rebound effect once change does occur.  Voluntary behaviour 
change is seen as both complementary to and as an alternative to regulation.  It is complementary 
in a few situations.  For one, it can show politicians and the business sector that there is support 
for measures to address climate change and thus act as a precursor to legislative action otherwise 
considered too radical to enact, or enable ‘green’ ventures to become commercially viable due to 
an increase in demand for the product or service without the need for taxes or some other 
incentive.  If successful in a particular endeavour, voluntary behaviour change can reduce the 
necessity for regulation by achieving a similar outcome to some law changes. 
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A combination of the three approaches to change will be likely to achieve the best results.  
Behaviours are determined by a range of factors, not for instance just those which are economic 
(Hinchliffe, 1996); so focussing on just one set of measures is likely to reduce the effectiveness 
of any implementation strategy aimed at bringing about a change of behaviour.  This means that 
encouraging voluntary behaviour change requires a focus on all levels and types of motivations 
behind behaviour (Lucas et al., 2008).  In particular psychological factors should be recognised as 
important (Leiserowitz, 2006; Stehr, 1997) and measures to address them must act in a 
complementary manner to other means of encouraging change (Jackson, 2005). 
A reliance on methods centred on economic motivations acts to strengthen those factors in 
the minds of individuals and may increase the difficulty of using other methods to encourage 
behaviour change (Hinchliffe, 1996).  This must add a sense of urgency to the task of finding and 
implementing solutions that use well judged combinations of approaches. 
 
3.6 Barriers to Voluntary Behaviour Change 
Modifying behaviour can be beneficial for the environment and thus society but change 
often does not occur among individuals of their own accord (Dawes & Messick, 2000).   Even 
when there are co-benefits and people are aware of a social norm in which they ‘should’ choose 
an environmentally beneficial behaviour, they often continue to act in the usual or default manner 
(Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008).  The reasons for such behaviour fall into a number of categories 
that include financial cost (Stern, 1999), lack of alternatives (Stanbridge et al., 2004), anticipated 
regret (Anderson, 2003), inconvenience (Stern, 1999), ignorance (Bulkeley, 2000; Wallace, 
1994), lack of concern (Semenza et al., 2008), laziness or habits (Stanbridge et al., 2004), the 
commons dilemma (Dawes & Messick, 2000) and perceptions that their contribution can make 
no difference, i.e. powerlessness (Jackson, 2005; Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  This research will 
focus on the last two, the commons dilemma and powerlessness. 
Even when the reasons for not changing listed above are not compelling, voluntary 
behaviour changes, like other methods of reducing environmental impact, is subject to the 
rebound effect (Binswanger, 2001).  For example individuals might replace their incandescent 
light bulbs with more efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs but no longer be concerned about 
switching them off when not needed.  While this can still result in a lessening of energy use part 
of the potential gain is lost. 
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These effects mean that sufficient voluntary behaviour change is unlikely to occur 
amongst individuals of their own accord.  Instead it is something that must be encouraged and 
supported through means such as third party campaigns.  Examples of these include the ‘Helping 
the Earth Begins at Home’ campaign run by the British government in the 1990’s and the ‘Be the 
Difference’ campaign run by the Greater Wellington regional council in the 2000’s.  Without 
these types of measures individuals are unlikely to modify their actions due to the many potential 
reasons for inaction that can be encountered (Jackson, 2005).  But encouraging behavioural 
change is a complex process in which individuals rarely act on information about causes and 
effects alone.  A wide range of other psychological and cognitive factors has been shown to play 
an important role in deciding whether and how individuals respond to climate change and under 
some circumstances to predict behaviour better than any considerations of society or economics 
(Grothmann & Patt, 2005). Psychological and cognitive factors can either encourage change or 
inhibit it and act as barriers to change.  Climate change is no exception and it is subject to a wide 
range of mental barriers (Harré, 2007).  In order for campaigns aiming to change behaviour to be 
most effective they must address specific barriers to change (Jackson, 2005).  Overcoming these 
barriers will require careful design and a thorough understanding of their causes and effects. 
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4. Powerlessness and the Commons Dilemma 
4.1 The Role and Importance of Powerlessness 
Within the topic of behaviour, powerlessness is a term that covers two different aspects in 
two different models. Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour uses powerlessness to refer to 
the perceptions that individuals have about their level of control over their actions.  That is, is an 
individual free to choose any option or are they forced to choose a particular one?  Stern’s (2000) 
Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of behaviour also includes powerlessness.  However in this model 
it has a different meaning, referring to perceptions of being powerless to affect an outcome by 
taking action.  That is, will taking action make some difference to the relevant result? 
This research will examine powerlessness as defined in Stern’s (2000) model, perceptions 
of powerlessness over results.  Specifically, in relation to climate change, powerlessness is the 
perception amongst individuals that the contribution from changing their own behaviour cannot 
have any impact upon either whether climate change occurs or the degree of change.  
Powerlessness of this nature is also commonly referred to as helplessness or fatalism.  This 
perception is an important barrier to behaviour change because individuals who consider 
themselves powerless to affect the outcome of an environmental problem have lowered 
motivation to make sacrifices to mitigate the issue (Haller & Hadler, 2008).  There are typically 
three main causes of powerlessness; these are information, confusion and the commons dilemma. 
Individuals’ feelings of powerlessness occupy an important position within the 
determination of pro-environmental behaviours and thus are considered to be a critical potential 
barrier to overcome.  Evidence of this is found in the prominent position of powerlessness in one 
of the chief theories used today to explain environmental behaviour.  This is the Values-Beliefs-
Norms theory, powerlessness forms Step 2c in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 Values Beliefs Norms model of environmental behaviour. Adapted from Stern (2005) 
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Within the Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of behaviour, values are defined as relatively 
stable characteristics of an individual’s personality; beliefs are more specific and can vary much 
more widely both between issues and over time; norms are derived from society and tend to be 
activated when, for example, beliefs that the environment is threatened and the individual can 
have an influence on this are present; and behaviours covers the various actions the individuals 
might take with pro-environmental intent (Stern, 2000).  Powerlessness fits into this theory as an 
influential belief at one end of the spectrum of beliefs about one’s ability to reduce threats.  As 
such, it is a belief that must be understood well in order to design effective communications on 
the topic of behaviour change. 
Experimental data backs up the importance of powerlessness as a predictor of 
proenvironmental intentions. Research has shown that people who are fatalistic regarding 
environmental issues have low levels of willingness to pay for environmental protection (r= -
0.455*) (Haller & Hadler, 2008).  The implication of this study is that those who are more 
powerless are less likely to take pro-environmental action.  This study incorporated survey data 
from multiple countries. 
These results suggest placing powerlessness in a key position as a predictor of 
environmental behaviours.  Based on this, it is expected that powerlessness regarding the ability 
to affect climate change will reduce the willingness of individuals to make changes that bear 
some cost, be it financial or otherwise e.g. inconvenience or time. 
4.2 The Effect of Information on Powerlessness 
4.2.1 Overview 
The Knowledge-Deficit (also termed Information-Deficit or Persuasion Theory) model of 
behaviour change underlies many communications to encourage behaviour change (Barr & Gilg, 
2007; Barr et al., 2001).  At the core of this idea is the notion that individuals, when informed 
sufficiently on the causes, consequences and risks associated with a particular behaviour, modify 
their actions accordingly (Hansen et al., 2003). 
 When the Knowledge-Deficit model is applied to environmental issues it typically means 
providing the target audience with information to indicate the severity of the problem.  The 
presumption is that once informed of the need and urgency for action the attitude of individuals 
will be modified, in turn leading them to change their behaviour.  This process is illustrated in 
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Figure 3 below.  Individuals are first given general information on a topic. Having understood 
this they are next provided with more specific details until the problem and potential solutions 
become ‘common knowledge’.  Following this it is expected that their attitude towards a given 
action is modified and finally in turn behaviour is also modified to a more pro-environmental 
course of action. 
 
Figure 3 Knowledge-Deficit model of behaviour change Adapted from Jackson (2005) 
 
 
The Knowledge-Deficit model, as applied to general environmental problems, has some 
support from empirical findings.  General knowledge of the environment and human interactions 
with it has been shown to correlate moderately with diminished feelings of fatalism and to a 
lesser degree with willingness to make sacrifices for environmental protection (Haller & Hadler, 
2008).  Similarly a high level of media attention given to environmental problems has been found 
to correlate positively with high levels of concern about environmental problems in the general 
public (Harrison et al., 1996).   At the same time this coverage was found to lead to a sense of  
too many issues ‘beyond the power and capacity of people to deal with’ (Harrison et al., 1996) i.e. 
an increase in powerlessness.  However a subsequent decline in news coverage led to an increase 
in cynicism and doubt about the validity of claims about environmental problems (Harrison et al., 
1996). However it must be noted that in both of these cases it is general knowledge of the 
environment as opposed to specific knowledge regarding any particular environmental issue. 
Messages aiming to influence individuals to change behaviour for reasons relating to 
climate change appear to be similarly motivated by a Knowledge-Deficit model and many 
campaigns with this aim have been shaped by this model (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Potter & Oster, 
2008).  For instance the popular movie An Inconvenient Truth takes this approach by presenting 
viewers with a large amount of information on the science of climate change (Kellstedt et al., 
2008; Potter & Oster, 2008).   
The actual effect of giving further information may be quite different from that desired.  
There is strong evidence suggesting that supplying more information about environmental 
problems to individuals is unlikely to result in a change to their behaviour despite increases in 
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intentions to change behaviour (Barr & Gilg, 2007).   Multiple factors are responsible for 
determining whether increased knowledge about a subject leads to increased action on the matter 
also.  Among these factors, powerlessness is known to be influential to behaviour (Haller & 
Hadler, 2008); therefore any influence that information has upon powerlessness is of interest to 
those trying to change behaviour using an information based approach. 
There have been multiple studies of the effect of levels of information, in terms of both 
quality and quantity, on levels of powerlessness.  These have covered both general environmental 
problems and the specific issue of climate change.  Results are conflicting. One study found that 
the greatest predictor of taking action and/or supporting legislation to mitigate climate change is a 
correct understanding of the mechanisms and causes of it (Bord et al., 2000).  This finding 
provides support for a Knowledge-Deficit model of behaviour change and is in line with the 
findings of Haller and Hadler (2008) about knowledge, fatalism and general environmental 
problems. 
Directly contrasting with the findings of Bord et al. (2000) are the results of another study.  
This study has found that when individuals have greater knowledge and certainty about the 
science of climate change, they show decreased levels of concern towards the problem (Kellstedt 
et al., 2008). The expected result of this is that individuals will take less action or show less 
support for climate change mitigation measures. Decreased concern about the risks associated 
with an environmental problem has been demonstrated to lead to higher levels of fatalism and 
lower levels of willingness to sacrifice (Bord et al., 2000; Haller & Hadler, 2008).  Exactly why 
individuals should exhibit lowered concern about climate change when they have greater 
knowledge of the science, as indicated by Kellstedt et al. (2008), which runs contrary to the 
Knowledge-Deficit model, is unknown.  A clue to a possible explanation is that ‘[f]acts do not 
determine behaviour so much as perceptions about facts’(Niemeyer et al., 2005). Powerlessness 
is likely to be one of those perceptions.  Powerlessness resulting from information might in turn 
be due, primarily to a combination of two factors, the scale of climate change and uncertainty.   
 
4.2.2 Information on the Scale of Climate Change 
Powerlessness often appears to arise in relation to the nature of information regarding 
climate change (Jackson, 2005).  When information presents an impression of climate change in 
which it is severe or difficult to mitigate, as may occur when messages raising awareness of the 
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issue focus upon catastrophic effects, powerlessness is a plausible reaction amongst individuals.   
Catastrophic effects frequently attributed to climate change in the media include increasing 
numbers or severity of hurricanes (Moss, 2009), melting polar ice caps (McKie, 2009) and rising 
sea levels (Wood, 2009). Such physical effects all take place at scales which are at least regional 
and often global.  At either of these levels the problem and potential solution are beyond the 
scope of an individual to deal with and indeed, even to comprehend (Nicholson-Cole, 2005).  
This can lead to confusion (examined in greater detail in the next section) or a feeling of being 
just a ‘drop in the ocean’ when compared to the global response that such problems necessitate 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  Additionally, a more direct result of information about catastrophic 
effects is the apparent disconnect between the huge problem and the small individual actions 
possible and frequently called for by proenvironmental campaigns.  For instance in the face of 
such huge and apparently overwhelming effects as devastating drought, the potential for one 
person to prevent or even influence them, by means of, for example, turning off a stereo, seems 
very slim (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001).   
Niemeyer et al. (2005) provide some evidence for a relationship between information and 
powerlessness in which information contributes to a raised level of powerlessness. Individuals 
were presented with different scenarios of climate change.  The more severe the impacts of 
climate change, the more individuals believed adaptation was unlikely to occur and the effects of 
climate change were inevitable, this represents an increase in powerlessness. Furthermore as the 
perceived difficulty of mitigation of an environmental issue increases the likelihood of an 
individual taking action decreases (Green-Demers et al., 1997).  Thus information that fosters 
perceptions of climate change as a huge problem may contribute to feelings of powerlessness and 
an acceptance that the consequences of climate change will be the same regardless of their 
contribution. Powerlessness of this nature, as influenced by messages, is well documented in 
response to earthquakes when messages focus upon the most severe effects (McClure et al., 
2007). 
 
4.2.3 The Role of Uncertainty 
Information on the scale of the issue is not the only way in which messages on climate 
change contribute to powerlessness.  When conflicts between norms occur, individuals often fall 
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back on powerlessness as an excuse for avoiding a decision on the issue (Schwartz & Howard, 
1981).  It seems likely that this also occurs when there are conflicts regarding information. 
In order to understand how uncertainty causes powerlessness and inaction it is necessary 
to draw upon several different theories.  The appropriateness framework (Weber et al., 2004) 
provides a starting point. This framework suggests that individuals in commons dilemma 
situations, like climate change, make decisions by asking themselves “What does a person like 
me do in a situation like this?”  In order to answer this question, individuals must be able to both 
identify the situation and identify the typical or expected responses, that is, norms.  Climate 
change presents a case in which both the situation and the typical response of others is hard to 
predict.  Assessments of the situation are difficult for the public.  Gauging the reality and severity 
of climate change is difficult when the messages they receive through the mainstream media 
portray far greater uncertainty about the issue than is present within the scientific community 
(Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  Assessing the typical response of others is 
increasingly difficult as the number of individuals and/or the temporal scale increases 
(Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006).   Climate change is made difficult to assess by its nature regarding 
both of these factors.  Firstly the time frame of climate change is not one that is conducive to 
building a clear picture of the response of others due to the differences in meaning between long 
term for the climate and long term for the individual.  A study in the United States found that 
when individuals were asked about ‘the future’ they thought of a time 10-15 years ahead (Tonn et 
al., 2006). Certainly this kind of timeframe is inadequate when dealing with climate change due 
to the greater length of time over which it occurs and the many lags involved (Moser & Dilling, 
2004).   Secondly climate change is also a global problem which affects individuals the world 
over; this makes assessing the response of others much more difficult, if not impossible, due to 
the huge number of variables present. With inability to identify the situation and/or the response 
of others, uncertainty is the result. Raised levels of uncertainty about environmental issues have 
been found to correspond with lowered levels of cooperation in a commons dilemma 
(Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006). 
Powerlessness is one pathway by which uncertainty leads to inaction. Uncertainty and 
disorientation due to a large number of messages, many subtly or significantly conflicting with 
each other, is identified as a cause of powerlessness about environmental problems (Kaplan, 
2000).  For individuals who are attempting to create a clear and coherent picture of the issue of 
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climate change, this can be overwhelming and they may simply ‘give up’ on the matter, perhaps 
by labelling it too big or too poorly understood for effective comprehension. Kaplan goes on to 
suggest that the reason for this is that individuals ‘hate’ to feel confused and instead prefer to find 
a simple way around this such as dismissing the issue by means of defining themselves as 
powerless and waiting for further information that resolves the conflict.  This process can be 
described as an ‘overloading’ of information and is consistent with Schwartz and Howard’s (1981) 
theory of how individuals cope with conflicting norms.  
An evolutionary perspective offers an underlying explanation for why individuals ‘hate’ 
confusion and seek ways to minimise it (Anderson, 2003). When human survival was much more 
marginal than it is today bad decisions might easily have made the difference between life and 
death of a group.  Therefore avoiding hasty decisions, staying with the status quo and deliberating 
to arrive at a complete picture would offer an evolutionary advantage. As regards climate change 
a similar response would mean that individuals wish to stick with the status quo, that is, take no 
action, until their confusion has been minimised, in the (probably vain) hope that the best 
possible decision is made. 
Figure 4 below presents a summary of the ways in which information about climate 
change can lead to powerlessness on the part of the individual.  This has been formed based on 
the review of current literature on the topic. 
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Figure 4 Summary of information and routes to powerlessness 
 
4.2.4 Uncertainty due to Characteristics Specific to Climate Change 
Climate change has several attributes that make it a topic more likely to create confusion 
amongst the public than other issues.  The nature of climate change is one that is both beyond the 
everyday experiences of individuals (Harré, 2007) and counter-intuitive to lay perceptions of 
climate. This has been suggested as a contributor to confusion and powerlessness (Stehr, 1997).  
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Among the public there is a general belief that climate (and nature in general) is constant and 
even.  This belief is summed up in statements such as 'The impression that climate is a constant 
phenomenon is deeply embedded in everyday consciousness and it is manifest in the profound 
confidence that any unusual seasonal or annual weather pattern must be compensated for in 
subsequent periods.' (Bruckner, 1890 cited in Stehr, 1997). 
Secondly compared to another atmospheric problem of recent years, the ozone hole, 
climate change is a difficult problem for a scientifically ill-informed public to grasp (Moser & 
Dilling, 2004; Ungar, 2000).  The ozone hole can be understood as a relatively simple chain of 
causes and effects from chlorofluorocarbons to ozone depletion to skin cancer.  This enables the 
public to quickly take on board knowledge of the problem and proceed to some level of support 
for mitigating it.  Climate change on the other hand is a much murkier topic with many causes 
and effects and uncertainties as well as a long time frame. These factors combine to make the 
topic much harder for the general public to grasp. 
Research into these areas however, is minimal and as yet there is little empirical evidence 
to support claims that climate change is a topic particularly prone to confusion amongst the lay 
public.  
4.3 Group Size and Characteristics 
So far this review has covered powerlessness in relation to levels of knowledge, 
information, confusion and attributes of climate change.  A further important consideration is 
how the individual views their contribution compared with that of the group.  When encouraging 
collective action from a group, theorists such as Olson (1971) expect group size to have a 
negative relationship with active involvement; i.e. individuals will take less action or show less 
involvement as the size of a group increases. 
With regard to taking actions to reduce contributions to climate change, group size and an 
individual’s significance within the group influence perceptions of powerlessness amongst 
individuals.  The reasons for this are criticality and personal efficacy.  It is unclear at this point 
whether both of these factors are of equal importance or if one overshadows the other.  Research 
needs to be conducted to clarify this. 
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4.3.1 Criticality: Will Each Make a Difference? 
Climate change can be viewed as a public bad (Tsur & Zemel, 2008) and thus the 
provision of a stable climate as the provision of a public good.  A public good is usually difficult 
to supply through voluntary behaviours alone (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1999) (see section 4.4 for more 
detail). This is especially true when the good crosses international boundaries (Desai, 2003) or 
has a very large group size (Hindriks & Pancs, 2002).  A stable climate certainly fulfils both of 
these categories.  Difficulty in supplying is due to the nature of public goods, which does not 
allow for those who do not pay for the good to be excluded from receiving the benefits of its 
provision.  This enables individuals to not pay for a good and still receive the benefits thus 
creating an incentive to free-ride. 
Despite this individuals do still contribute in public good situations (Dawes & Messick, 
2000).  Individuals, when assessing whether or not to contribute to a public good, take into 
account the ‘criticality’ of their contribution.  Criticality is the assessment of whether or not their 
contribution will be the deciding factor in whether or not a public good is provided.  When 
individuals feel that their actions are critical to the outcome, which is that their contribution will 
be the deciding factor, they are more likely to be motivated to act on an issue.  The reverse, that 
individuals are less likely to contribute if a public good is provided regardless of their actions, is 
also true (Cremer & Dijk, 2002).  Whether an individual’s contribution is likely to be critical 
depends largely on the size of the group involved.  The effect is such that the likelihood of an 
individual’s contribution being critical decreases as the scale of the public good increases.  
Climate change is an issue of such wide scope, both crossing international boundaries and having 
a global group size, that few, if any, individuals’ or even countries’ contributions are critical in 
this direct manner.  Thus egoistic individuals are likely to be reluctant to take on a cost to prevent 
climate change when they judge that the outcome will be the same with or without incurring that 
cost.   
4.3.2 Personal Efficacy: Will My Contribution Matter? 
The idea of criticality with regard to the provision of a stable climate is not entirely 
appropriate.  It applies most strictly to a public good which has only two possible conditions, 
fully provided or not provided at all.  This is not a valid description of climate change.  The 
problem does not show a ‘clear line’ between a fluctuating or altered climate system causing 
harm on one hand (see Figure 5) and a stable climate bringing benefits on the other.  Instead there 
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is a continuum of varying degrees of effect (see Figure 6).  Thus it is more appropriate to 
examine individuals’ perceptions of powerlessness in relation to their assessment of how much 
they feel able to influence the degree of climate change rather than the outright occurrence of 
climate change. 
 
Figure 5 Dichotomous Climate Change appropriate to criticality 
 
 
Figure 6 Continuous climate change appropriate to personal efficacy 
 
The assessment of individuals as to whether they may have some influence upon an 
outcome of group behaviour is known as personal efficacy.  It means that individuals believe they 
can produce a desired effect through their actions. When used in the context of the topic of this 
research the desired effect is a lessening of, though not necessarily complete halt to climate 
change as a result of modifications individuals make to their behaviour.  It has been shown that 
when individuals believe they have a high level of personal efficacy, environmentally beneficial 
behaviour is more likely to result (Eden, 1993).  Further evidence comes from the study of 
behaviour in public good situations. The greater the impact individuals believe they will have on 
the outcome the more likely they are to contribute (Laury et al., 1999).   
Both the size of the problem and the group involved has a large influence upon personal 
efficacy.  For one as the size the problem increases then the marginal benefit from each 
individual’s contribution decreases.  Decreases in the marginal benefit of an individual’s 
contribution have been shown to lead to lowered levels of efficacy (Yu et al., 2009).  Personal 
efficacy also decreases as group size increases (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997; Seijts & 
Latham, 2000).  This is due in part to the decline marginal benefit from each individual that 
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occurs as the number of individuals rises. But additional to this individuals believe that with a 
larger group co-operation declines and defections are likely to overtake contributions, wearing 
away any benefit from those contributions and thus reducing personal efficacy (Kerr, 1996).  In 
effect, the huge, indeed global problem and group size of climate change could reduce personal 
efficacy to next to nothing.  Comments such as’ “I think that there are a lot of people who feel 
that no matter what I do I can’t do anything about that [climate change] anyway”(Norgaard, 
2006), are indicative that this evaluation of the situation does occur amongst individuals. 
Although it is argued that personal efficacy is more appropriate for the problem of climate 
change than criticality from a strict evaluation of the problem, ultimately it is the judgement of 
individuals in the wider public that matters.  Some evaluate the situation in terms of criticality 
and some in terms of personal efficacy.  Therefore understanding both is important to changing 
behaviour. 
4.4 The Commons Dilemma as Motivation to Not Contribute 
A commons dilemma (also termed tragedy of the commons or in psychology literature a 
social dilemma) is a situation in which all individuals are better off if all co-operate, yet all have 
incentives to defect (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Weber et al., 2004).  Such a situation occurs with 
the provision of a public good.  A public good is defined as one that is non-rival i.e. its use does 
not deplete it, and is also non-excludable i.e. when the good is provided, all individuals share in 
the benefit, even those that do not pay for or provide it.  It is the non-excludable characteristic 
that is most important in creating the dilemma. 
An informed self-interested individual, so theory suggests, wishes to see the public good 
provided because they benefit in some manner from the provision.  But any self-interested 
individual also prefers not to pay for the good’s provision if it will still be provided without their 
payment.  For instance if the provision of a particular public good relies on 1000 equal 
contributing individuals then each person is responsible for 0.1% of the good.  Following a self 
interested path of action any individual will be better off if they do not contribute and rely on 
everyone else to.  By acting in this manner they receive a good that in 99.9% of what it might 
have been, at no cost to themselves.  This behaviour is known as free riding.  Eventually, each 
individual following this rationale, all will defect from contributing to the good and none will 
receive any benefit.  In reality defections do not reach 100% because self-interested, egoistic 
decision making is not the only factor important to deciding whether people contribute or not 
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(Biel & Gärling, 1995; Cremer & Dijk, 2003; Weber et al., 2004).  But when personal interests 
are affected by either the outcome of or solution to a commons dilemma, self interest tends to 
play an important role compared with other motivations, for instance justice or fairness (Müller et 
al., 2008). 
Other characteristics influential in deciding whether an individual contributes or not in a 
commons dilemma are the size of the group involved, the temporal element and if anonymity of 
contributions exists.  Defections from the group become more frequent when contributions 
required are multiple or ongoing and take place over a long period of time (Clark & Sefton, 2001; 
Isaac et al., 1985).  Increasing the group size involved in the commons dilemma also leads to a 
higher rate of defection (Isaac & Walker, 1988).  When contributions to a public good are 
anonymous the result is lowered levels of cooperation (Bixenstine et al., 1966; Fox & Guyer, 
1978).  
Free-riding is among the most important factors behind decisions to not contribute in a 
commons dilemma.  It may influence either directly, as is the case when individuals decide to 
free-ride on the contributions of others, or indirectly.  Indirectly refers to instances in which a 
belief that others will free-ride leads to the decision to not contribute.  Individuals’ considerations 
and experiences of the free-riding motive and its effect on the actions of others are known to 
influence their decisions concerning how to act to solve the dilemma (Gachter & Thoni, 2004; 
Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996). When this motive is recognised or perceived it can lead to the 
decision to not contribute to a public good. Evidence to support this has been found by Hindriks 
and Pancs (2002) who have shown that individuals are more likely to donate to the provision of a 
public good when the probability of others doing so is high.  Similarly both Biel and Garling 
(1995) and Green-Demers et al. (1997) have found that a belief others will act in the same 
manner as oneself leads to lowered uncertainty and subsequently a higher rate of cooperation.   
Among the reasons for lowered cooperation when free-riding is believed to exist are 
powerlessness (Vasi & Macy, 2003)  and fairness (Clark & Sefton, 2001).  Powerlessness, as 
influenced by free-riding, takes the form of a belief that the individual’s contribution is 
insignificant by itself and that others will continue to not join any necessary cooperative effort 
thus making the desired result impossible to achieve.   This is evident in the way in which climate 
change, as an example of a commons dilemma, can elicit such responses, used to justify inaction, 
as ‘I alone can do nothing, I can achieve something only if the others join’,(Stoll-Kleemann et al., 
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2001).  For the individual this is powerlessness over the outcome.  Fairness is addressed in detail 
in the following section. 
What matters is not so much whether free riding occurs, but whether or not the motivation 
to free ride is perceived by those making decisions either to contribute or not.  In most instances 
the behaviour of others in a commons dilemma remains unknown and it is the uncertainty about 
what choices others will make that is important for determining an individual’s behaviour (Biel & 
Gärling, 1995; Green-Demers et al., 1997; Hindriks & Pancs, 2002).   
4.4.1 Fairness and Equity 
In addition to effects upon powerlessness free-riding also contributes to inaction on 
climate change by way of concerns about fairness and equity.  Fairness, in a public goods 
situation, can be defined as ‘the desire to be kind to those who signal kindness through their 
actions and to hurt those who signal hostility through their actions’ (Keser & Winden, 2000).  
Considerations of fairness are known to have an effect on the behaviour of individuals in 
commons dilemmas.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have shown that sometimes even fair-minded 
individuals are likely to not cooperate in the provision of a public good when they consider there 
to be just a small number of unfair or self-interested individuals present who will not cooperate 
and punishing those individuals is impossible.  
It seems unlikely that mitigation of climate change could be a public good which will 
allow for the punishment of non-cooperators and so it is expected that considerations of fairness 
and equity along with powerlessness will be causes of inaction that arise from perception of or 
concerns about free-riding by others, in terms of mitigation effort. 
Although not linked directly with powerlessness fairness and equity concerns are 
addressed here because of the similar causes and in the interests of presenting a complete picture. 
 
4.4.2 Climate Change as a Commons Dilemma 
Climate change is a clear example of a commons dilemma (Milinski et al., 2006; Pfeiffer 
& Nowak, 2006). The benefits of the mitigation of climate change are non-excludable and non-
rival and it therefore fits the criteria of a public good.  The added mitigation of climate change 
resulting from an individual changing behaviour, e.g. changing mode of travel, represents only a 
very small marginal increase. The added costs of changing that behaviour represent a large 
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marginal increase for the individual such that the individual responsible for the action will, if 
egoistic, wish to continue their current course of action and let others bear the cost of changing 
behaviour to mitigate climate change i.e. they will wish to free-ride.  It is therefore 
understandable that the individual continues to undertake activities which contribute to climate 
change.  The problem also fits all the criteria covered in the preceding two sections which should 
lead to the commons dilemma being an important cause of inaction on climate change due to 
free-riding.  Climate change is a commons dilemma with a long time frame, a global group size 
and actions that contribute to or mitigate climate change are, for the most part, anonymous 
(Milinski et al., 2006; Pfeiffer & Nowak, 2006).  The result of this is that even individuals who 
are not egoistic recognise that climate change is a problem likely to be affected by free-riding.  
They then incorporate this knowledge into their decision making process and as a consequence of 
this they decide to contribute a reduced amount. 
4.5 Coping with Conflicts of Norms and Values 
Many of the above ways in which powerlessness is caused require some degree of 
comprehension and thought about the issue of climate change. For instance a judgement of being 
too insignificant to affect change requires a consideration of the global scale of climate change 
and the individual’s place within the associated group.   
But powerlessness also acts as a barrier to behaviour change in ways that require little 
comprehension and thought. This occurs when making a decision on a course of action is 
complicated by conflicting norms and/or values associated with two or more mutually exclusive 
choices. In such a case an individual can delay or avoid the decision by the use of powerlessness 
as a justification for inaction. 
Individuals generally have norms to act in a socially responsible manner (Schwartz & 
Howard, 1981).  Pro-environmental actions are one form of socially responsible behaviour.  
However such behaviour has costs which conflict with personal, egoistic, values, for instance 
paying for carbon offsets costs money which might be spent on other goods or services.  When 
such costs and difficulties in carrying out a behaviour are encountered norms are found to have 
little predictive power regarding actual behaviour (Corraliza & Berenguer, 2000).  To understand 
this it is useful to draw on Schwartz and Howard’s (1981) normative decision making model of 
behaviour.  This model predicts that if individuals must choose between conflicting norms to 
follow when making a decision they react by denying any ability to make a difference i.e. 
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labelling themselves powerless. This has the effect of allowing the individual to avoid making a 
difficult decision between the conflicting norms.   
In section 4.2.3 it has been shown that this model of decision avoidance and justification 
via powerlessness applies to conflicts regarding information.  That the conclusion of this model 
should also apply to conflicts between norms and values is a reasonable assumption.  Especially 
in light of research showing that people are likely to justify inaction through powerlessness when 
they feel the costs of change, a danger to egoistic values, are high (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 
1997).    
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) suggest that also influencing decisions in which a conflict between 
pro-social norms and personal values are present is guilt.  Individuals act to justify and overcome 
guilt at not taking action i.e. not following pro-social norms; by suggesting they ‘couldn’t have 
made a difference anyway’.  This result is exactly what is expected if Schwartz and Howard’s 
(1981) normative decision making model also applies to conflicts between norms and values. 
4.6 Summary: Powerlessness and the Commons Dilemma 
 
Figure 7 Diagram of influences and effects of powerlessness 
 
Figure 7 presents a model of powerlessness that may be drawn from the current 
understanding of the perception with the literature.  Powerlessness on the issue of climate change 
is linked to three key matters.  Firstly there is the scale of the issue, secondly the individual’s 
assessment of the behaviour of others, thirdly confusion on the subject is also of importance.   
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The issue of scale contributes to powerlessness as individuals feel insignificant with 
respect to their ability to improve the situation, i.e. they have low levels of personal efficacy.  In 
the case of climate change the global scale makes any one individual’s contribution seem so 
small that it can have no effect.  The chief influence on this perception of powerlessness due to 
insignificance is information that attributes expected or current catastrophic occurrences to 
climate change.   
Concerning the role of others, it is the perceived incentive to free-ride, resulting from the 
commons dilemma nature of climate change that contributes to inaction via powerlessness.  This 
incentive leads to a belief that others will not join in working towards a solution, preventing the 
achievement of a positive outcome.  Individuals also take into consideration their own position 
and importance compared to others and the group as a whole.  The huge group size involved in 
climate change means that each individual is only a negligible part.  This should reduce personal 
efficacy and criticality to close to zero.  The result of this is powerlessness.  
Confusion has a significant impact on powerlessness.  Confusion occurs on two subjects, 
the first is the science of climate change and the second is the expected response of the individual.  
When unable to reach firm conclusions on either of these subjects individuals are unlikely to take 
action and will justify this by declaring themselves to be powerless to affect change. 
Based on these findings it is expected that powerlessness is prevalent as a cause of 
inaction towards mitigating climate change.  Powerlessness with its varied causes generally 
means one thing for individuals: they consider that regardless of how they act the outcome will 
be the same.  This is expected to be of importance in influencing behaviour towards climate 
change. 
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5. The Present Study 
5.1 Gaps in Knowledge and Direction of Research 
Current understanding of powerlessness is not adequate for the purpose of designing 
effective campaigns to minimise and/or overcome the barrier to action it presents.  The available 
theory and research suggests that powerlessness is an important influence on people’s actions 
regarding environmental issues such as climate change, but there exists little available evidence 
to confirm or reject this either internationally or in New Zealand. There is an adequate 
understanding of powerlessness in relation the commons dilemmas cause, for example the effects 
of criticality and personal efficacy in addition to the ways in which information contributes to 
powerlessness; however the relative importance of these factors, both in relation to each other 
and other possible causes of inaction, is not well understood.   
Nor is the importance of powerlessness in relation to the specific issue of climate change 
often addressed in the literature.  These are significant gaps in current knowledge about 
perceptions of powerlessness and climate change.  This has implications for the effectiveness of 
campaigns to change behaviour voluntarily.  The aim of this research is to determine the 
importance of powerlessness in relation to other causes of inaction on climate change.  Once that 
is clarified the relative importance of the various causes of powerlessness will also be studied. 
5.2 Hypotheses 
The broader aim of this research is to build up a picture of how individuals perceive 
climate change and how those perceptions affect their behaviour.  In particular individuals’ 
perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma are examined in more detail.  Five 
hypotheses will be tested to achieve this.  They are as follows: 
 
1. A high perception of powerlessness is associated with a lowered level of action on climate 
change. 
 Heightened levels of powerlessness have been shown to lead to lowered levels of action 
on general environmental issues by other researchers (Haller & Hadler, 2008).  Climate change is 
not expected to differ in the way individuals respond to powerlessness. 
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2. A high perception of the commons dilemma is associated with a lowered level of action on 
climate change. 
In cooperative situations in which a commons dilemma exists individuals are less likely to 
contribute to any necessary action (Dawes & Messick, 2000).  Climate change is an example of a 
commons dilemma (Milinski et al., 2006) and therefore it is expected that individuals who rate 
the commons dilemma highly will take less action. 
 
3. A high level of information is associated with a high level of powerlessness. 
 Within the literature different studies of the effects of information on powerlessness have 
given conflicting results.  Bord et al. (2000) and Haller and Hadler (2008) have found that 
individuals with greater levels of information, on climate change and environmental problems 
respectively, have lower levels of powerlessness.  Other research by Kellstedt et al. (2008) 
indicates the opposite effect.  This hypothesis is therefore included in order to clarify this debate. 
 
4. A high level of information is associated with a low rating of the risk of climate change. 
 This hypothesis is closely related to hypothesis 3.  Kellstedt et al. (2008) have found that 
individuals with greater knowledge about climate change show less concern about the risks of 
climate change.  Both Bord et al. (2000) and Haller and Hadler (2008) have shown that 
individuals with less concern about environmental issues are less likely to take action.  Since 
many campaigns aiming to increase pro-environmental behaviour rely on giving information 
about a problem to individuals the results of Kellstedt et al. (2008) are of great importance for 
future campaigns.  The aim of this hypothesis is to test this finding. 
 
5. A high rating of the risk of climate change is associated with a high perception of 
powerlessness. 
 Research suggests that individuals who believe the risks associated with climate change 
are high are also more likely to be powerless about the possibility of mitigating climate change 
(Niemeyer et al., 2005).  If true this finding has severe implications for the Knowledge-Deficit 
Model which involves informing target individuals about the risks associated with certain 
behaviours.  Testing this hypothesis adds more data to this currently underexplored topic. 
31 
 
 
 
6 Methodology 
6.1 Overview 
Research on the questions in the previous section was conducted through three key 
methods, searches of peer-reviewed journal articles, focus groups and a survey.  Journal articles 
provided the information necessary for the shaping and direction of research.  Qualitative data 
was collected via four focus groups.  A survey of members of the public was then conducted to 
provide vital quantitative data on the importance of powerlessness.  The combination of focus 
groups and a survey represents a mixed-method approach and has been chosen because both 
methods combined are able to provide a more complete picture than either alone (Creswell & 
Clark, 2007).  Journal articles were then used once again to provide the framework needed to 
analyse and interpret the results of the primary data collection. 
6.2 Literature Review 
A literature review has provided the basis for this research.  As is expected of such a 
process the literature review both set the context of this research and shaped its direction (Garson, 
2002). Searches were limited to peer reviewed journals in order to achieve the highest level of 
conclusiveness possible from the review.  An exception was made in a small number of instances 
when peer reviewed journals were unable to provide desired information on the topic.  The 
literature review was conducted using both general and academic search engines that cover many 
peer reviewed journals. 
6.3 Focus Groups 
6.3.1 Focus Group Organisation 
Whilst a survey provides valuable information on the importance of powerlessness and 
the various reasons for that perception it does not provide more detailed qualitative information 
on people’s experiences of this perception.  This information may be invaluable in exploring 
some of the reasons why people feel powerless.  In order to uncover these reasons it is useful to 
facilitate focus groups where a more detailed discussion takes place.  This is an accepted method 
of gathering qualitative data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and a good means of using qualitative data 
to overcome the shortfalls of quantitative data (Creswell & Clark, 2007).  Through the 
discussions, undertaken for this research, individuals are asked to elaborate upon topics focussed 
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around their actions or inactions towards climate change and their underlying motivations.  The 
focus groups have two key purposes: one, to uncover possible reasons and causes of inaction on 
climate change overlooked or missed during the literature review process and two, to investigate 
why people perceive powerlessness. This kind of qualitative information is difficult to obtain via 
a survey only.  A total of four focus groups were held to obtain this information.  This attracted a 
total of twenty one individuals.  All involved were over the age of 18 years. Due to the 
limitations of this study they were all held within the greater Wellington region.  In recognition of 
the many differences present within the Wellington population four locations with differing 
socio-demographics were chosen for focus groups; Karori East, Karori Park, Berhampore (all 
within Wellington City) and Lower Hutt.  Participants were sought via a pamphlet drop in the 
vicinity of each focus group.  A $20 supermarket voucher was given to each for their time. 
 
Table 1 Socio-demographics of census areas where focus groups were held from 2006 
Census (StatsNZ, 2006a) 
 Karori East Karori Park Berhampore Lower Hutt 
Population 3,468 4,122 2,595 97,701 
Education (post 
high school) 
65.9 % 56.3 % 46.7 % 40.5 % 
Income (median) $38,200 $32,000 $24,000 $27,300 
Families with 
Children 
65.5 % 61.4 % 58.8 % 65.3 % 
3 or more 
vehicles 
9.9 % 8.3% 4.7 % 12.0 % 
 
But there are still problems inherent in such quantitative research.  Focus groups are 
subject to self selection, tending to attract individuals who are particularly interested in the issue 
or with strong opinions.  It is therefore noted that it is not the aim of focus group research to be 
representative of the wider community’s views.  Additionally focus groups provide data that is 
much more subject to the interpretation of the researcher and bias may result from this also 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007). 
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6.3.2 Focus Group Topics 
The central purpose of the focus groups was to explore powerlessness on the issue of 
climate change within a general theme of inaction on the matter.  The three main themes covered 
were; knowledge about the issue; personal actions; and perceptions, first about the size of the 
issue and secondly about the role of others. 
 
Knowledge 
Discussion initially focussed upon participants’ general knowledge of the climate change 
issue.  The Values-Beliefs-Norms framework of behaviour (Stern, 2000) predicts that beliefs 
about individuals’ ability to reduce a threat are important determinants of behaviour and 
knowledge is important in the formation of these beliefs.  Knowledge was therefore explored to 
build context for later discussion of specific beliefs about powerlessness.  Empirical findings by 
Haller and Hadler (2008) support the hypothesis that higher general knowledge about the 
environment relates to lower levels of powerlessness. Theory (Jackson, 2005) and research 
relating specifically to climate change (Kellstedt et al., 2008) back these findings up.  The 
questions discussed were: 
- What do you think causes climate change? 
- Who is responsible for climate change? 
- Can climate change be stopped? 
- What needs to happen to stop climate change? 
 
Personal Actions 
Discussion then looked more closely at the beliefs of individuals regarding perceived 
ability or inability to make a difference to the outcome of climate change.  This was examined by 
looking at both society as a whole and the role of individuals. The questions discussed were: 
- Do you take any actions to lessen climate change? 
- What effect do you believe these actions achieve? 
- Do you think you could take more actions? 
- Why do you not take some actions? 
 
Perceptions of the size of the problem and other’s roles/actions 
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 In order to uncover the reasons behind powerlessness, final discussion explicitly covered 
points expected to be important following literature review.  These are: the role of the individual 
in the group i.e. personal efficacy (Eden, 1993; Kerr, 1996); information about large scale effects 
(Jackson, 2005; Kellstedt et al., 2008); and the commons dilemma nature of climate change 
(Isaac & Walker, 1988; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996). The questions 
discussed were: 
- If you think about the global scale of climate change what do you feel? 
- How do you feel when you think about the problems like sea level rise? 
- Would you voluntarily change your actions or make some payment to reduce climate 
change if you knew it would definitely have an impact? 
- If you knew that by contributing you would cause somebody else to take no action 
would you still continue to do so? 
6.4 Survey Method 
Journal articles on the occurrence of fatalism in individuals in a variety of settings 
generally include measurements of powerlessness taken via survey or interview.  Typically 
interview subjects are asked to evaluate a number of statements using a Likert scale in which they 
provide a rating in the form of a number (or phrase). This indicates their thoughts on the 
importance for them of various possible causes of a given circumstance or occurrence.  For 
instance a survey of powerlessness in the United States of America (Cohen & Nisbett, 1998) 
asked individuals to attribute various aspects of life, such as economic status, to causes ranging 
from God’s will (high powerlessness) to hard work (low powerlessness).  A study of political 
powerlessness in former Soviet countries (Goodwin & Allen, 2000) asked respondents to 
evaluate questions such as ‘Life is like a lottery’ on a scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 5 
(very strongly agree). 
These research articles reported few problems with the method and Likert scales are 
generally accepted as one means of measuring powerlessness within psychology.  The survey for 
this research therefore used a scale similar to Goodwin and Allen (2000). Respondents were 
asked to provide a rating between 1 and 5.  For the main body of the questionnaire 1 represented 
‘Not Influential’ and 5 represented ‘Very Influential’ (see Figure 8). Some questions used 
different measures where appropriate.  A numerical scale was used, as the survey aims to uncover 
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the relative importance of powerlessness and causes of powerlessness and a numerical system 
allows for easy comparison and analysis of scores on different variables. 
 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
The questions covered a range of possible causes of inaction from cost to lack of 
knowledge.  These were based on the focus groups undertaken for this research, the responses of 
interviewees from two studies of public perceptions about climate change in England (Lorenzoni 
et al., 2007) and Switzerland (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001) as well as questions derived to 
measure the importance of other factors found to be significant during the literature review. 
A survey is quantitative data research.  It is therefore recognised to have limitations that 
are inherent to this form of research.  Of particular concern to the research is the fact that surveys 
hide the context in which people speak and also cover up individual voices that might otherwise 
provide valuable information (Creswell & Clark, 2007).  This reason and the problems associated 
with qualitative data collection already covered are why a mixed-method approach was chosen. 
 
6.4.1 Survey Questions 
Unless otherwise indicated, respondents were asked to answer question by giving a rating 
on a 5-point scale.  See questionnaire in Appendix 2 for specific scales used for each question.  
The questions were as follows: 
 
1. How well informed do you consider yourself on the issue of climate change? 
The purpose of this question was to enable the study to examine the possible relationship 
between knowledge on the issue of climate change with both levels of concern and powerlessness.  
Consistent with Kellstedt et al. (2008) an inverse relationship between knowledge of climate 
change and level of concern was expected.  A decrease in an individual’s level of concern about 
climate change when knowledge of the issue increases seems counter-intuitive and raises further 
questions about the accuracy of the measure i.e. the individual may mistakenly believe they 
Figure 8 The Likert scale used for the main body (Questions 7 - 20) of the questionnaire 
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possess all the information needed to make a judgement.  However Kellstedt et al. (2008) show 
that self-reported knowledge on other environmental issues, e.g. pollution, correlates positively 
with increased levels of concern about the issue.  They therefore suggest that individuals 
informed on climate change can reasonably be pessimistic about their ability to change the 
outcome and declare themselves unconcerned about the issue as a means of justifying inaction.   
It is recognised that this is a self-reported measure and as such is open to different 
interpretation.  For instance within the U.K. many individuals who reported themselves as highly 
or moderately informed on climate change believed, erroneously, that the ozone hole and climate 
change were tightly linked problems (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).   
 
2. To what extent do you believe human activity is contributing to climate change? 
The very idea of changing behaviour to lessen climate change requires that the 
phenomenon be caused, at least in part, by human activities.  If individuals consider climate 
change to be entirely natural then the rest of their responses are likely to reflect this and they are 
logically less likely to have seriously considered any behaviour change. 
 
3. How severe do you consider the problem of climate change? 
Kellstedt et al. (2008) suggest that higher levels of knowledge about climate change and 
environmental problems respectively are associated with lower ratings of risk.   Kellstedt et al. 
(2008) also find higher knowledge about climate change associated with higher levels of 
powerlessness.    If these associations were also found amongst the sample group of this research 
then a negative correlation with knowledge (measured in Question 1), and a positive correlation 
with powerlessness due to lowered personal efficacy (measured in Question 15 below) were 
expected.  Combination of this Question with Question 4 allowed for the creation of a Perceived 
Risk composite variable. 
 
4. How soon should climate change be dealt with? 
Questions 2, 3 and 4 provided the main information on respondents’ beliefs about climate 
change as a problem.  This question on the urgency which climate change needs to be dealt with 
provided a different perspective on how important the problem of climate change is considered 
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by individuals.  Urgency and severity are logically distinct but may in practice be conflated; 
hence a positive correlation with responses to Question 3 is expected.   
 
5. Have you changed your actions, at least partly, due to consideration of climate change? 
This key question enabled study of correlations between inaction and the possible causes 
that were investigated in later questions.  It should be noted that as with measures of knowledge 
this is a self reported scale and therefore issues of accuracy are raised.  It has been noted that self 
reported behaviours correlate better with intentions than actual behaviours (Stern, 1992). 
 
6.  How much has climate change been a factor in changing your actions? 
There are often co-benefits from behaviour that is beneficial in lessening climate change 
e.g. monetary savings to the individual.  This question enables evaluation of whether these other 
benefits were more influential than any desire to lessen climate change.  Despite the potential 
limitations with this question, which are the same as those noted for question 5, the question was 
vital to determining the degree to which individuals are acting in relation to climate change. 
Trials of the questionnaire found that asking Question 5 alone caused confusion and more 
importantly masked differences between climate change being the primary reason for change or 
merely a small factor. 
 
Questions 7 to 20 are all possible reasons for inaction on climate change.  They are 
presented under the general heading of: 
 
How influential have the following factors been in shaping your own decisions about actions 
that might affect climate change? 
The aim of this section was to uncover which factors, both psychological and otherwise, 
were seen as having the greatest relative importance in causing inaction.  All the possible reasons 
for inaction included in the questionnaire were based upon the focus groups conducted prior to 
the survey, research by others such as Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) and Lorenzoni et al. (2007), 
and reasons predicted to be of importance based upon literature review, e.g. personal efficacy 
(Kellstedt et al., 2008; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997) and information (Barr & Gilg, 2007; 
Jackson, 2005). 
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7. The monetary cost of changing my actions 
This question measured the importance of financial factors in causing inaction, for 
instance the cost of choosing a hybrid vehicle rather than a less fuel efficient alternative can 
prevent change.  By combining Questions 7, 8, 9 and 10 the composite variable Option Difficulty 
was created. 
 
8. The availability of options for change 
If options for change are not available, then psychological factors will be of little 
importance for predicting inaction. For instance an individual may feel they can make a 
difference to climate change by driving less but is unable to switch due to the unavailability of 
public transport suiting their needs. 
 
9. The inconvenience of options for change 
Financial costs to change are not the only costs.  This question measured the importance 
of inconvenience that is associated with changing habits, e.g. having to wake earlier to catch a 
bus.  
 
10. Fitting changes in with family and others 
Inconvenience is one of the costs associated with changing behaviour.  This was partially 
examined by Question 9.  This question examines whether inconvenience about change is caused 
not directly by the change or alternatives, but indirectly due to necessities of fitting schedules 
with and meeting the needs of others. 
 
11. Lack of knowledge about possible changes I can make 
Communications to change behaviour based on the knowledge deficit model have often 
included information on possible changes people can make to alter their impact upon the 
environment (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Barr et al., 2001).  This question measured this by asking 
whether ignorance about choices is influential in predicting inaction by individuals. By 
combining with Question 12 an Option Uncertainty composite variable was able to be formed.  In 
addition to this a general Confusion composite variable was able to be formed by combining 
Questions 11, 12 and 13. 
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12. Uncertainty about the best options to contribute to reducing climate change 
Evidence from Anderson (2003) suggests that individuals will put off decisions and/or 
actions until they are certain about the reasoning behind the decision and the consequences 
resulting from it.  This question measured the importance of so called ‘inaction inertia’ in relation 
to climate change decisions. 
 
13. Uncertainty as to whether climate change is a significant problem 
While Question 11 and 12 focus on information about ‘solutions’, Question 13 focuses on 
uncertainty about the problem.  Evidence suggests that individuals may respond to complex and 
contradictory messages about climate change by categorising the topic as uncertain and not acting 
on the issue until that uncertainty is resolved (Kaplan, 2000; Schwartz & Howard, 1981).  This 
question allowed investigation of this prediction.  
 
14. The feeling that climate change is too big for my actions to have an impact 
This question directly measured powerlessness. A widespread perception of 
powerlessness is expected given the messages and information in the media and elsewhere that 
portray climate change as either a huge or global problem (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Jackson, 2005).  
This question will evaluate the importance of this particular cause by looking at how individuals’ 
perception of the scale of the issue affects their judgements on the potential to make a difference.  
Together with Question 15 and 16 a Powerlessness composite variable was able to be formed. 
 
15. The feeling that my actions will not affect the outcome of climate change 
This question addressed powerlessness in the form of beliefs about scale and criticality. 
When making decisions about contributing to a public good individuals tend to consider whether 
they believe their contribution will make the difference between provision or not (Cremer & Dijk, 
2002).  Individuals may or may not assess actions beneficial to climate change outcomes in such 
a manner.  However the question was included in order to examine this. 
 
16. The feeling that my contribution is just a drop in the ocean and so is insignificant 
This question also addressed powerlessness and scale in the form of beliefs about personal 
efficacy.  This matter is central to powerlessness.  Individuals, when deciding whether to take 
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collective action, consider their place within the group (Olson, 1971).  When group size is large 
individuals are expected to feel a low ability to make any difference to an outcome (Kerr, 1996) 
and a low willingness to contribute to protecting the environment (Eden, 1993).  Collective action 
is applicable to climate change solutions and the large group size is expected to reduce the belief 
of individuals that their contribution matters to very low levels.  It is therefore predicted that 
answers to this question will show it to be influential and correlated with low levels of acting 
upon climate change.  Whether this shows a positive correlation with knowledge on the issue is 
also of interest.  If it does it provides backing for the idea that more information on climate 
change could promotes powerlessness. 
 
17. Feeling that other individuals will not change their actions even if I do 
This question addressed association between powerlessness and the commons dilemma.  
In commons dilemma situations individuals consider the actions of others when determining their 
own behaviour and when free-riding is expected contributions are decreased (Wade-Benzoni et 
al., 1996).  With a large group, as climate change entails, free-riding in expected to be more 
prevalent (Isaac et al., 1985).  It is therefore expected that this is influential and shows a 
correlation with inaction.  As with Question 16 a correlation with knowledge on the issue will be 
of interest.  Together with Question 18 and 19 a Commons Dilemma composite variable was able 
to be formed. 
 
18. Unfairness associated with bearing the cost of change whilst others do not 
Research has shown that fairness considerations play a part in deciding an individual’s 
actions in a commons dilemma (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).  This question therefore examined this to 
see if fairness is important in deciding individuals’ action on climate change.   
 
19. Other countries or people not taking equivalent action currently 
This question measured the degree of importance individuals attach to the equivalence of 
actions by others. This factor should be important according to previous research (Wade-Benzoni 
et al., 1996).  The decision to classify others as both people and countries was made on the basis 
of information acquired during focus group research. Discussion on this topic frequently led to 
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participants citing both other individuals and other countries as examples of those not taking 
action currently.  It also opens up an international comparative perspective. 
 
20. Looking foolish due to being the only one to change actions 
This question measured whether individuals feel pressure to act in the same way as their 
peers.  If it is shown to be a strong influence it could suggest that social norms exist which favour 
acting in a non-environmentally friendly manner until others do so. 
 
The remaining questions were socio-demographic: 
21.  Please indicate your age and sex 
Under 20 
20 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60+ 
 
Male/Female 
 
This question allowed for the data to be analysed for possible correlations between 
powerlessness, age and sex.  Five categories are provided to allow for reasonable resolution of 
data. 
 
22. What is your highest level of education? 
No Qualification __ 
High School Qualification __ 
Tertiary Degree __ 
Tertiary Other __ 
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23. If you don’t mind, please indicate your individual income? 
$0 - $25,000 __ 
$25,001 - $50,000 __ 
$50,001 - $75,000 __ 
$75,001+ __ 
 
These questions allowed for data to be analysed for possible correlations between 
powerlessness, education and income.   
 
6.4.2 Administering 
The survey was conducted by requesting responses from a sample of individual passers-
by on the street conducted between 12pm and 2 pm on three days, the 11th, 12th and 14th of 
November 2008.  Individuals approached were offered the chance to complete the questionnaire 
and in return were offered a chocolate bar as a token reward. Three locations in Wellington and 
Lower Hutt cities were chosen.  This was to achieve a broader sample of people than one site is 
likely to provide.  It is recognised that this method is imperfect and may over represent 
Wellington and Lower Hutt office workers. However given the time and money constraints 
present, the required locations were needed to be both within Wellington and with high volumes 
of foot traffic making these three locations the best option.   
 
6.4.3 Locations 
Location 1 – Midland Park, Corner of Lambton Quay and Johnston St, Wellington 
Location 2 – Corner of Cuba Mall and Dixon St, Wellington 
Location 3 – Corner of Bunny St and Queensgate St, Lower Hutt 
 
Due to the nature of the locations which have high daytime populations but relatively low 
immediately resident populations a summary of socio-demographic statistics for the immediate 
area surrounding the survey location would provide an inaccurate picture of the survey 
respondents.  Therefore socio-demographic statistics are given here for the local suburban region.  
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Basic socio-demographic statistics of the respondents at each location are given in the results 
section. 
 
Table 2 Socio-demographics of survey areas from 2006 Census (StatsNZ, 2006a) 
 Wellington City Lower Hutt New Zealand 
Population 179,463 97,701 4,143,279 
Education (post high school) 55.5 % 40.5 % 40.0% 
Income (median) $32,500 $27,300 $24,400 
Couples with Children 43.2 % 44.7 % 42.0% 
Age (median) 33.1 35.1 35.9 
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7 Results 
7.1 Focus Group Results 
This section presents the findings from the four focus groups conducted.  Confidentiality 
of the participants was important and therefore names have been omitted.  All quotes are taken 
from discussions.  Text in square brackets is used to improve the clarity of quotes where relevant.   
In order to allow ease of reading ‘ums’ have been removed.  Results presentation is structured 
around the three key themes of the discussions addressed in chapter 6.3.2 
 
7.1.1 General Knowledge and Beliefs about Climate Change 
When asked what the causes of climate change were participants provided a wide range of 
different answers on both specific and nonspecific causes.  The most common answer given was 
a nonspecific cause, that of pollution or industrial waste. 
 
Industrial fumes and waste and things like that. 
 
Brought about by the industrial revolution. 
 
Different types of pollution.  Related to radiation and nuclear experiments.  Anything that 
is bad for the Earth.  Free radicals and car fumes. 
 
Because of airplanes. There’s a lot of pollution, and the cars and industry, smoke. 
 
Put it down basically to industry.  Even if it was natural it wouldn’t be happening this 
quickly.  To do with chemistry and chemicals and everything we’re pumping into the 
environment generally I would say. 
 
There was general agreement from members of the focus group who did not add 
additional information when these answers were given.  Some gave more detailed answers 
providing a specific cause.  Of those carbon emissions or CO2 was the most frequently cited 
direct cause. 
Carbon emissions.  Carbon dioxide, the amount that is pumped into the atmosphere. 
 
Carbon emissions 
 
The ozone hole was also frequently named as a specific cause of climate change. 
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I think partly it could be depletion of the ozone layer.  That area around Antarctica has 
increased quite markedly.  I remember in the 1970’s the concern about the propellants 
that are used for sprays and things, chlorofluorocarbons I think they’re called, they were 
quite widespread.  People were using them in sprays and things.  That could be a major 
cause of pollution in the atmosphere. 
 
Natural thinning of the ozone layer in parts of the world such as the Antarctic. 
 
Only one participant expressed knowledge of deforestation as a cause of climate change.  
Three participants expressed knowledge of previous historical changes in climate.  Only one 
participant showed a level of skepticism or denial about anthropogenic causes of climate change 
 
There’s some doubts about the connection between carbon dioxide and global warming.  
The planet is warming certainly. 
 
Discussion then moved on to cover who was responsible for climate change.  Participants 
generally laid the responsibility with large organizations or groups.  Responsibility covered two 
different issues; one was which groups were causing climate change.  The second was which 
groups needed to put efforts into fixing the problem. Three of the four discussions saw China 
raised as a particular country responsible for causing current and future climate change.  In 
particular China was seen as responsible due to rapid growth and large industrial output. 
 
Chinese. 
 
Bigger countries that are pushing their production above the needs of the rest of the 
world, so I guess countries like China, pushing their production all over the place and not 
really thinking about the consequences. 
 
For some participants blaming China was coupled with an expression of futility about 
solving the problem. 
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Whatever we do in the western world is going to make no difference while China is going 
down the path they are now. 
 
Governments were frequently named as responsible for taking action to address the 
problem of climate change. 
 
The world leaders, those in power and authority.  They control every individual country 
through legislation. 
 
…it’s up to governments to try and regulate things. 
 
You could say governments in general. Maybe sort of have the power to influence.  They 
can outlaw certain types of fuel burning. Or they can encourage it and therefore cause 
[climate change]. 
 
The role of individuals, including themselves, was also raised on numerous occasions. 
 
I think we all are as individuals. 
 
99.99% of the population, except a few greenies. 
 
The ultimate cause is the population being so large. 
 
When asked if climate change could be stopped responses across all groups tended 
towards the belief that climate change might possibly be slowed but not stopped altogether. 
 
I think the impact can be minimised or slowed, but it can’t be stopped. 
 
I think it can be slowed down but not really stopped. 
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The natural forces are far too great, far too great. 
 
One participant noted that a ‘tipping point’ might have been passed which results in 
climate change becoming unavoidable.  When questioned whether this had been reached he was 
unsure, but thought possibly it had already been passed.  Some participants expressed views that 
if some large changes were to occur in society it might be stopped. 
 
I think we could stop it if we got rid of half the world’s population. 
 
If someone created an alternative mainstream source of transport other than petrol. If 
suddenly there was no more oil tomorrow, I’m sure someone would create a technology 
and it could be environmentally friendly. 
 
Others showed a belief in education about environmental problems and solutions.  This 
was often directed at the younger generation. 
 
I think too education.  We can start with the next generation.  Maybe you can change the 
way they look at things. 
 
Education is the important thing.  Especially if they educate from younger generations up 
to older ones.  From primary right up to college. If they’re educated at a young age they 
know what’s going on and they know how to go about reducing pollution levels when they 
get to an older more responsible age. 
 
A respondent at one of the groups believed there was a need for more awareness about the 
environmental effects of decisions and a shift from short term thinking to long term holistic 
thought.  At another of the discussions a participant expressed a similar belief in the need for 
change from a consumer oriented society to a less wasteful one in which we are happier with less 
material possessions.  Another common suggestion was for the government to become more 
involved in a solution by means of regulation to prohibit and reward certain behaviours. 
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Government needs to make greater penalties for those that pollute and things that are 
harmful for the environment. 
 
It’s back to the government regulations again.  I think you really need to start enforcing it. 
 
Only one participant mentioned the use of household level measures as a means of 
stopping or slowing climate change. 
 
Just doing things like turning lights off, walking, biking, turning off appliances, little 
things on an everyday basis. It will have an impact on the amount of electricity we use. 
 
7.1.2 Personal Actions Regarding Climate Change 
Participants were asked what, if any, actions they take to reduce their contribution to 
climate change.  In answer to this almost all participants across all discussion groups named 
recycling first and foremost. 
 
Yes, well recycling is the obvious one. 
 
Recycling… 
 
Following on from these points participants talked of reducing the use of various goods 
and services that they believed had some sort of impact on climate change. Note that the last 
quote and the next one were from the same sentence. 
 
…..and you’re just aware of wastage of water and power, and whether you use the car or 
not etc. 
 
…I compost and recycle everything I can 
 
Make sure plugs are turned off at the wall, if you’re not using them.  It’s not much. 
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Walk and use public transport rather than having the car. 
 
At the supermarket level we use less plastic bags. 
 
Growing one’s own vegetables was mentioned at three of the four groups.  One 
participant said that they had sold their car and bought a motorbike which cut down on petrol use 
and saved a lot of money.  To this another participant replied that they thought that act and many 
of the others mentioned earlier were undertaken simply because they saved money and not due to 
concerns about climate change.   
Discussion covered the topic of whether more actions could be taken by individuals to 
reduce their contribution to climate change.  Participants generally believed that they did as much 
or close to as much as they could do to reduce their impact on climate change.  Reasons for not 
taking action were also raised at this point.  They will be addressed separately. 
 
I think we could all do more. 
 
I think I could do a lot more. 
 
It’s hard, but for me I think I do as much as I can. 
 
Discussion in one group covered what was felt to be the limiting factor of unavailability 
of options for change.   When this group was then asked specifically for actions they might take 
that were available to them now, there was no response. 
Participants generally felt that the reasons they did not take more actions to reduce their 
impact on climate change were factors outside of their control.  Participants in one group 
believed there was a bit more they could do but felt the chief limiting factor was a lack of 
appropriate schemes and facilities put in place by the local government to deal with waste.  The 
inability to recycle plastics beyond number 2 and lack of an organic waste collection were given 
as examples. Businesses were also blamed for a lack of commitment to reducing waste through 
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means such as biodegradable supermarket bags, eco-packaging and reducing excessive 
advertising material. 
 
Meat packaging can be made out of cornmeal.  It’s biodegradable but costs money. 
 
Discussion in other groups tended towards more personal barriers to taking action.  Time, 
inconvenience and money were mentioned by several participants across three of the groups. 
 
I think it comes back to money. 
 
Keen to take more actions like insulation but I’m not entitled to any of the [monetary] 
benefits you can get [from the government] so to me it’s a complete waste of time.  
There’s no incentive to do it. 
 
It’s cheaper to be on the grid than invest in solar cells. 
 
It’s a question of time and cost…….. We could all do more if it wasn’t so timely, costly. 
 
Probably convenience.   You’re out and about and it’s difficult to recycle, got to take them 
[rubbish] home or just throw them out. 
 
Several respondents expressed a belief that society today acts a barrier by creating a lot of 
pressure to accumulate goods and replace things swiftly rather than repair them. 
 
The economic system in which we live.  It’s like the survival of the fittest, you feel helpless.  
I have to have something, just in case I lose my job.  There’s all this [pressure] to 
accumulate and work and all that has an environmental impact. 
 
A lack of knowledge about options to change was raised at only one discussion group.  It 
was raised in two different manners.  The first and most prominent was a discussion regarding the 
lack of distribution of information about recycling and waste disposal.  They were concerned by a 
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lack of awareness about ‘E-Day’ a local electronics recycling event and about the correct way of 
discarding of paint until it were too late in both cases.  The second time a lack of knowledge was 
raised it regarded uncertainty. 
 
Uncertainty what the right action is. 
 
7.1.3 Perceptions about Climate Change 
The third theme of the focus groups focused on the perceptions that individuals had about 
climate change, both in terms of scale and the role of others.  When asked how the global scale of 
climate change made people feel, initial responses at several focus groups were: 
 
Powerless, totally powerless 
 
Pretty small (at two groups) 
 
Some participants then expressed stronger views on the issue. 
 
Blame someone else, blame China, blame the [United] States. 
 
It makes you wish you could sit down with George Bush and say, what are you doing to 
the environment? 
 
Totally just pissed off 
 
Some participants gave examples of what they felt was the insignificance of their actions 
when compared to the size of much larger users of resources.   
 
As individuals we were turning off everything at home [due to concerns of electricity 
shortages resulting from low hydro lake levels], then you go outside and there’s 
streetlights on everywhere, lights blazing in the offices.   
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I think the Canterbury region uses more water in a week than the entire rest of the 
country.  So even if we all stop running our taps while we brush our teeth and whatever, 
these [major] irrigators are using up all the water 
 
The focus group was used to examine how people felt when they were presented with 
information about some of the catastrophic effects of climate change such as strengthened 
hurricanes and sea level rise.  Most groups quickly joked about not living near the sea before 
moving onto more serious discussion. 
 
I’m worried that something really drastic is going to have to happen before governments 
do anything about it. 
 
Disheartened again. 
 
We all know the ice caps are melting but what can we do about them?  They’re so far 
away. 
 
Feel pretty powerless, why isn’t anything happening [to stop the effects].  It is a bit 
demoralising. 
 
Too depressing, go and do something else. 
 
Some participants stated they simply hadn’t thought about the issues either at all or in any 
detail.  When further questioned as to whether they thought about any of these issues in 
connection with everyday acts like putting out recycling the response was no, they hadn’t. 
Following on from this, participants were asked if they would voluntarily pay or take actions to 
reduce climate change if they knew that would definitely be a positive result from doing so.  
There was an almost universal agreement from those that responded that yes they would do 
something if they could see the benefits of making a payment or taking an action. 
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Yes I would if I knew it would definitely make a difference. 
 
Some participants gave more detailed answers, suggesting conditions they would like to 
exist or know about before making some such payment or taking an action. 
 
If the cost is local I would expect the benefit to be local. 
 
Depends how much you would be investing and what the gain would be. 
 
At one of the discussions participants believed that such a voluntary scheme would be 
good but ultimately unlikely to solve the issue. 
 
[voluntary behaviour] will only get 10-15% of people, you won’t get the mainstream. 
 
I think you’ve really got to have the carrot and the stick.  For those doing the right thing 
there needs to be some kind of financial benefit but there also has to be punishment for 
those doing harm.  But I think there has to be a way to avoid it to reduce complaints. 
 
Discussion then covered the hypothetical scenario of whether participants would still 
continue to donate to a scheme to reduce climate change if they knew that by doing so someone 
else would decide not to and instead free-ride upon their contribution.  Participants at one group 
all agreed that they would still contribute.  Those that provided a reason believed it would make 
them feel good or that if they were willing to contribute so too would others, even if some did not.  
From other groups participants gave similar responses. 
 
I’d say yes because I’m a leader not a follower. 
 
Yes because it’s actually helping. 
 
I think you’ve still got to do it. 
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There’s always been this block of society that are just completely disengaged with the 
values of the rest.  The best we can do is be united as a majority. 
 
Some participants though gave different responses. 
 
I’d put less in because it would annoy me. 
 
I’d be less enthusiastic. 
 
Sometimes maybe.  Sometimes you might say better that someone does it. 
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7.2 Survey Results 
7.2.1 General Statistics and Socio-demographics 
Questionnaires were filled out by 201 participants.  Nine questionnaires were discarded 
where more than 20% of the questions were not completed.  Of those questionnaires entered for 
analysis, 79 were from Location 1, 57 from Location 2 and 56 from Location 3. Socio-
demographic information collected from Questions 21, 22 and 23 is shown in table 3 
 
Table 3 Comparisons of socio-demographics from survey and census (StatsNZ, 2006b) 
 Survey Socio-
demographic 
Census Statistics Difference Survey 
- Census 
Age 
Under 20 
20 – 29 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60+ 
Unspecified 
 
 
8.9% 
35.9% 
21.4% 
15.1% 
8.9% 
8.9% 
1.0% 
 
 
28.7% 
13.2% 
14.3% 
15.0% 
12.1% 
16.7% 
- 
 
-19.8% 
22.7% 
7.1% 
0.1% 
-3.2% 
-7.8% 
N/A 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Unspecified 
 
 
48.4% 
45.3% 
6.2% 
 
 
48.9% 
51.1% 
- 
 
-0.5% 
-5.8% 
N/A 
Education 
No Qualification 
High School Qualification 
Tertiary Degree 
Tertiary Other 
Unspecified 
 
 
6.2% 
27.1% 
43.8% 
21.4% 
1.6% 
 
 
25% 
35% 
11% 
29% 
- 
 
-18.8% 
-7.9% 
32.8% 
-7.6% 
N/A 
Income 
$0 - $25,000 
$25,001 - $50,000 
$50,001 - $75,000 
$75,001+ 
Unspecified 
 
 
21.4% 
34.4% 
18.8% 
20.3% 
5.2% 
 
 
45.8% 
27.9% 
8.9% 
7.3% 
10.2% 
 
-24.4% 
6.5% 
9.9% 
13.0% 
-5.0% 
 
A comparison of the socio-demographic data collected in the survey and the census data for 
the entirety of New Zealand shows several notable differences.   
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A considerably lower proportion of those who completed the survey were under 20 years of 
age compared with the whole population.  A greater proportion of those completing the survey 
were aged between 20 and 39 than in the whole population and fewer are in the groups higher 
and lower (over 60 and under 20) 
Male and Female proportions show no notable differences from the wider population data. 
The survey participants had much higher education levels than the general population.  Most 
notable was the higher proportion holding tertiary degrees.  Also noteworthy is the much lower 
proportion having no qualification when compared with the general population. 
The survey socio-demographic had higher incomes than the nation as a whole.  There was a 
lower proportion earning $25,000 or less.  The other income brackets all showed higher 
proportions in the survey participants, in particular the $75,001+ group. 
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7.2.2 Results from Questions 1 – 6 Knowledge and Attitudes about Climate Change 
 Table 4 presents the results of the first six questions from the survey.  They provide the 
data on respondent’s levels of knowledge, attitudes and actions regarding climate change. 
Table 4 Results of Survey Questions 1 -6 
Question Mean Standard Deviation 
1. How well informed 
do you consider 
yourself on the issue 
of climate change? 
3.17 
 
0.89 
 
2. To what extent do 
you believe human 
activity is contributing 
to climate change? 
3.95 
 
1.05 
 
3. How severe do you 
consider the problem 
of climate change? 
3.83 
 
0.96 
 
4. How soon should 
climate change be 
dealt with? 
4.25 0.98 
 
Question Yes No 
5. Have you changed 
your actions, at least 
partly, due to 
consideration of 
climate change? 
134 (70%) 58 (30%) 
 
Question Mean Standard Deviation 
6. How much has 
climate change been a 
factor in changing 
your actions? 
3.13 1.01 
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7.2.3 Results from Questions 7 – 20 Ratings of Influences on Own Actions Affecting 
Climate Change 
 Table 5 presents the results of Questions 7 – 20 from the survey.  These provided data on 
the importance of various perceptions in shaping actions taken regarding climate change. 
Table 5 Results of Survey Questions 7 -20 
Question Mean Standard Deviation 
7. The monetary cost of 
changing my actions 
3.07 1.05 
8. The availability of options 
for change 
3.32 1.06 
9. The inconvenience of 
options for change 
2.88 0.95 
10. Fitting changes in with 
family and others 
2.85 0.99 
11. Lack of knowledge about 
possible changes I can make 
3.08 1.01 
12. Uncertainty about the 
best option to contribute to 
reducing climate change 
3.09 1.06 
13. Uncertainty as to whether 
climate change is a 
significant problem 
2.57 1.10 
14. The feeling that climate 
change is too big for my 
actions to have an impact 
2.74 1.17 
15. The feeling that my 
actions will not affect the 
outcome of climate change 
2.73 1.22 
16. The feeling that my 
contribution is just a drop in 
the ocean and so is 
insignificant 
2.75 1.21 
17. Feeling that other 
individuals will not change 
their actions even if I do 
2.74 1.25 
18. Unfairness associated 
with bearing the cost of 
change whilst others do not 
2.70 1.25 
19. Other countries or people 
not taking equivalent action 
currently 
2.92 1.31 
20. Looking foolish due to 
being the only one to change 
actions 
1.80 
 
1.00 
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On ratings of influences on one’s own actions Availability of Options for Change was 
consistently ranked more influential than the next most influential option (t-test p<0.03).  
Uncertainty about the best option for change was not ranked significantly higher than Lack of 
knowledge about the possible changes I can make (t-test p<0.85) and together these two factors 
are second equal in ranking.  Looking foolish due to being the only one to change actions is rated 
as the least influential item.  The difference between it and the next least influential item, 
uncertainty about the significance of climate change is found to be significant (t-test p<.00). 
 
7.2.4 Composite Variables 
 Tables 6 and 7 provide data on composite variables that were created out of various 
questions from the survey. 
Table 6 Composite Variable Perceived Risk 
Composite Variable Composite of 
Questions: 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Perceived Risk 3, 4 4.04 0.89 
 
Table 7 Composite Variables from Questions 7 - 20 
Composite Variable Composite of 
Questions: 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Option Difficulty 7, 8, 9, 10 3.03 0.74 
Option Uncertainty 11, 12 3.09 0.92 
Confusion 11,12,13 2.91 0.83 
Powerlessness 14, 15, 16 2.74 1.11 
Commons Dilemma 17, 18, 19 2.79 1.07 
 
 
A number of individual items were combined into composite variables based on their 
conceptual similarities (see Table 7).  Option Difficulty and Option Uncertainty are not shown to 
be significantly different from one another (t-test p<0.40), but are shown to be significantly 
higher rated (more influential) than Powerlessness and Commons Dilemma (t-test p<0.01 and 
0.00 respectively).  Powerlessness and Commons Dilemma are not shown to be significantly 
different (t-test p<0.48). 
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7.2.5 Correlations 
Table 8 Correlations from Questionnaire Data L
ooking Foolish 
C
om
m
ons D
ilem
m
a 
P
ow
erlessness 
U
ncertainty –Signif. of C
C
 
O
ption U
ncertainty 
O
ption D
ifficulty 
Im
portance of C
C
 in A
ctions  
T
aking A
ction 
P
erceived R
isk 
H
um
an Influence on C
C
 
H
ow
 Inform
ed 
 
-.09 
-.16* 
-.26*** 
-.16* 
-.26*** 
 .05 
 .22** 
 .16* 
 .21** 
 .17* 
1 How Informed 
-.01 
 .02 
 .04 
-.15* 
 .19** 
 .22** 
 .36*** 
 .28*** 
 .72*** 
1  Human Influence on CC 
-.07 
-.03 
-.09 
-.16* 
 .17* 
 .22** 
 .39*** 
 .41*** 
1   Perceived Risk 
-.11 
-.27*** 
-.20** 
-.08 
 .03 
 .18* 
N
/A
 
1    Taking Action 
-.11 
-.02 
-.23** 
-.12 
 .03 
 .23** 
1     Importance of CC in Actions 
.13 
.23** 
.11 
.13 
.36*** 
1      Option Difficulty 
.19** 
.31*** 
.34*** 
.39*** 
1       Option Uncertainty 
.34*** 
.47*** 
.41*** 
1        Uncertainty - Significance of CC 
.29*** 
.62*** 
1         Powerlessness 
.38*** 
1          Commons Dilemma 
1           Looking Foolish 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Composite variables are in italics   
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Table 8 provides the results of analysis of survey data for correlations between various 
factors.  Where relevant, composite variables are used instead of non-composite variables. 
Perception of How Informed about Climate Change 
Option Uncertainty and Powerlessness show the strongest associations with How 
Informed about climate change individuals consider themselves.  Both show negative correlations 
which are low but still significant at the 0.001 level. For example respondents stating that they 
are well informed about climate change are less likely to indicate a lack of knowledge about 
possible changes they can make and less likely to profess uncertainty about the best option to 
contribute to reducing climate change.  Similarly respondents considering themselves well 
informed on climate change are less likely to consider climate change too big for their actions to 
have an impact. Perceived Risk has the third strongest correlation with How Informed, showing a 
low positive relationship significant at the .01 level. Those considering themselves well informed 
on climate change are more likely to see climate change as a severe and urgent issue. 
Taking Action on Climate Change 
The strongest association with whether individuals have taken action is Perceived Risk.  
Perceived Risk has a moderate correlation with Taking Action that is significant.  Thus 
individuals who consider the risks associated with climate change to be high are more likely to 
have taken action than those who consider these risks low.  Human Influence on Climate Change 
and Commons Dilemma have the second strongest associations with Taking Action and both are 
significant.  The correlation between Taking Action and Human Influence on Climate Change is 
positive, meaning individuals who believe climate change is mostly caused by humans are more 
likely to have taken action.  The correlation between Taking Action and Commons Dilemma is 
negative and those who rate Commons Dilemma highly are less likely to have taken action on 
climate change. 
Importance of Climate Change in Actions Taken   
The correlation with Perceived Risk is the strongest association with Importance of 
Climate Change in Actions found.  It is a moderate positive correlation and significant.  This 
means that those who believe climate change has a high risk associated with it are more likely to 
rate climate change as an important factor when changing behaviour.  The second strongest 
association is a moderate positive correlation with Human Influence on Climate Change, which is 
significant. Thus those who believe humans influence climate change to a significant degree are 
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more likely to rate climate change highly as an important factor when changing behaviour.  How 
Informed, Powerlessness and Option Difficulty all show similar levels of association with 
Importance of Climate Change in Actions and all are significant.  Powerlessness shows a 
negative correlation while the other two show positive correlations.  Those who consider 
themselves powerless are less likely to consider climate change important in changing their 
actions.  Those who consider themselves well informed or consider the difficulties of change to 
be higher are more likely to consider climate change important in changing their actions. 
Powerlessness 
Powerlessness and Commons Dilemma show a strong, positive correlation.  This is the 
strongest correlation with Powerlessness shown in this survey.  A moderate, positive correlation 
with Uncertainty about Significance of Climate Change is the second strongest association.  A 
moderate positive correlation with Option Uncertainty is the third strongest.  These three 
relationships are all significant.  These correlations mean that those who consider themselves 
powerless to effect the outcome of climate change are more likely to also feel the commons 
dilemma is important and feel uncertainty about both options and the importance of climate 
change are important.  A fourth correlation of interest is the moderate, negative and highly 
significant relationship with Importance of Climate Change in Actions. This means that those 
who consider themselves powerless are less likely to place importance on climate change in any 
behavioural change. 
Commons Dilemma 
The correlation with Powerlessness is the strongest association with Commons Dilemma 
found.  It is a strong positive correlation and is significant.  For example, those who rate 
Powerlessness highly are more likely to rate Commons Dilemma high also.  The second strongest 
association is a moderate positive correlation with Uncertainty about Significance of Climate 
Change and is highly significant.  The third strongest association is a moderate positive 
correlation with Option Uncertainty, and is significant.  Higher ratings of both Uncertainty about 
Significance of Climate Change and Option Uncertainty are both associated with higher ratings 
of Commons Dilemma. 
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Other Correlations 
A high positive correlation between Perceived Risk and Human Influence on Climate 
Change was found.  This result is significant.  It is the strongest correlation uncovered between 
any variables in the questionnaire.  It suggests that respondents who consider human activity 
contributes to climate change are much more likely to consider climate change an urgent and 
severe problem.  Also highly significant is the moderate positive correlation, .46***, between 
Availability of Options for Change and Monetary Cost of Changing my Actions (not shown in 
Table 8).  This indicates that those individuals who consider the Availability of Options for 
Change a constraining factor are also more likely to consider that the financial cost is a 
significant barrier to change also. A moderate positive correlation between Looking Foolish and 
Commons Dilemma was found and is significant.  No significant correlation was found between 
Importance of Climate Change in Actions and Commons Dilemma. This indicates that those who 
consider the Commons Dilemma to be important are no more likely than those who do not to rank 
climate change as a strong factor in changing their actions. 
7.2.6 Regression Analyses 
Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 provide the results of regression analysis of various items from 
the survey.  Where relevant composite variables were used instead of non-composite variables. 
For the regression analyses, Perceived Risk and Human Influence on Climate Change were 
combined into one variable.  This is based on two factors:  The two items are strongly associated, 
possibly representing a degree of conflation on the part of the individual (see section 8.5.1).  The 
two factors are so strongly associated that each greatly reduces the predictive power and 
significance of the other in regression analysis. Combining the two variables thus allows a more 
appropriate analysis than does the inclusion of both separately. 
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Table 9 Simultaneous Regression Analysis for Socio-demographic and Other Factors 
predicting Taking Action 
 Variable Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients 
B Std. Error B β 
Risk and Human Influence .21 .04 .40*** 
Commons Dilemma -.14 .04 -.35*** 
Income -.07 .03 -.15*.... 
Option Difficulty .07 .05 .12...... 
Confusion .05 .04 .10...... 
Age .03 .02 .10...... 
Gender .08 .07 .09...... 
How Informed .04 .04 .08...... 
Qualification .04 .04 .07...... 
Powerlessness -.00 .04 -.01...... 
Looking Foolish -.00 .03 -.01...... 
*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 Simultaneous Regression Analysis for Socio-demographic and Other Factors 
predicting Importance of Climate Change in Actions Taken 
 Variable Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients 
B Std. Error B β 
Risk and Human Influence .58 .14 .37*** 
Powerlessness -.26 .10 -.26**.. 
Age .21 .07 .26**.. 
Option Difficulty .34 .14 .22*.... 
Commons Dilemma .18 .10 .18...... 
Looking Foolish -.11 .10 -.11...... 
How Informed .12 .11 .10...... 
Qualification -.10 .11 -.07...... 
Gender .08 .18 .04...... 
Confusion .03 .13 .02...... 
Income .02 .09 .02...... 
*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
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Table 11 Simultaneous Regression Analysis for Socio-demographic, Background and 
Influence Rating Variables Predicting rating of Powerlessness 
 Variable Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients 
B Std. Error B β 
Commons Dilemma .54 .07 .53*** 
How Informed -.21 .09 -.17*.... 
Confusion .20 .10 .15*.... 
Age .08 .05 .10...... 
Difficulty -.07 .10 -.05...... 
Gender -.10 .15 -.05...... 
Income -.03 .07 -.03...... 
Looking Foolish -.01 .08 -.00...... 
Qualification .01 .08 .00...... 
Risk and Human Influence .00 .09 .00...... 
    
*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 Simultaneous Regression Analysis for Socio-demographic, Background and 
Influence Rating Variables Predicting rating of Commons Dilemma 
 Variable Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients 
B Std. Error B β 
Powerlessness .48 .06 .50*** 
Looking Foolish .19 .07 .18**.. 
Confusion .24 .09 .18*.... 
Age -.11 .05 -.14*.... 
Difficulty .15 .10 .10...... 
Income -.07 .07 -.07...... 
How Informed .06 .08 .05.  ... 
Qualification .05 .08 .04...... 
Gender -.03 .14 -.01...... 
Risk and Human Influence -.03 .08 .00...... 
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8 Discussion 
8.1 Focus Groups 
8.1.1 General Findings 
Participants showed a diverse set of beliefs, levels of knowledge and opinions regarding 
climate change.  A review of all of these allows for some conclusions to be drawn as to how at 
least some of the public view climate change. 
 Across the range of topics covered in the focus groups there was a tendency for 
participants to simplify issues down to what they perceived to be the single most significant 
factor.  For instance, those who provided a specific cause for climate change chose to name 
carbon dioxide from industry.  There was little to no acknowledgement of the more diverse 
causes such as deforestation or methane.  When providing examples of those responsible for 
causing climate change, either China or the USA were frequently named.  Smaller more 
numerous contributors at the country, organisation or personal levels were not generally given.  
Both of these examples illustrate cases in which just the perceived largest single factor was 
named.   
Simplification could be seen to represent a means of avoiding confusion when 
considering decision making.  By simplifying the issue to one or two causes and effects it is more 
easily grasped than an issue which is more complex.  Other possible causes may be that 
individuals simply lack the knowledge about more diverse answers, or, that within the context of 
a focus group they prefer to give only limited rather than complete answers.  One implication of 
this simplifying of climate change issues is that it will make rational decision making difficult 
due to the absence of the prerequisite knowledge.  This might lead to psychological barriers to 
change having a heightened level of importance over factors such as cost. 
 Another occurrence noted amongst the focus group participants was the apparent lack of 
distinction between climate change and other environmental issues.  This was evident at several 
points during the discussion.  Initial talk of the causes frequently led to industry being named, a 
cause so broad that it could cover all manner of environmental problems from acid rain to water 
pollution.  There was also confusion between climate change and the ozone hole, a 
misunderstanding frequently found in studies of public awareness of climate change (Futerra, 
2004; Ungar, 2000).   Furthermore when participants were asked what actions they took to reduce 
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their contribution to climate change they frequently stated composting or recycling.  Both of 
these actions have, at best, weak connections to climate change and are generally considered as 
remedies for other problems such as resource depletion or landfill overuse.  These cases illustrate 
a tendency to not deal with climate change, either conceptually or in actions, as separate from 
general environmental problems.  This may be due to factors such as the limited time available to 
the general public to engage in actively learning about environmental problems, thus constricting 
a clear understanding of the distinctions.  Overall, this finding is supported by the observation 
that, regarding most questions, the majority of participants in each group had little or nothing to 
add to the discussions, suggesting prior consideration of the topics, necessary to the formation 
strong opinions, had not taken place. 
8.1.2 Powerlessness  
 Several questions during the focus group stage examined points of relevance to 
powerlessness.  Most participants believed that they could take more actions to reduce their 
contribution to climate change.  When discussion then moved to what the reasons for not taking 
action were, all answers centred on time, money, inconvenience, lack of knowledge and most 
often of all, unavailability of choices.   These options represent, in varying degrees, 
powerlessness over behavioural control as used in Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour.  
This is especially true of the last and most cited reason, availability of choices.  This thesis 
examines powerlessness in the form of control over outcomes.  Neither this reason, nor the 
commons dilemma, were given as reasons for inaction.   
This does not mean that powerlessness over outcomes is not a reason for inaction.  Instead 
several processes may account for the absence of it as a stated reason.  Firstly individuals may 
not fully understand the reasons behind their choices and simply state what they believe is 
important i.e. erroneously state the unavailability of options as important when in fact it is not.  
Secondly they might feel some measure of guilt at not taking action and prefer to state reasons 
that place it outside of their control and in so doing reduce guilt.  Thirdly, in section 8.1.1, 
discussion covered what appeared to be simplification of issues down to the factor perceived to 
be the most important by participants in the focus groups.  It is consistent with this last point that 
individuals providing reasons for not taking action should fail to state those reasons that, though 
possibly important, are considered secondary. 
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Powerlessness was mentioned when individuals were asked how they felt in the face of 
messages about the global scale of climate change.  Participants reported feeling powerless and 
small in the face of an issue of such scale.  But those who gave more elaborate answers talked of 
the scale of their actions compared not with the global size of the problem but instead in relation 
to much larger contributors to climate change such as China or industry.  These findings suggest 
that individuals do feel powerless to deal with climate change. It also suggests that much of the 
perception of powerlessness stems not from the sheer scale of climate change but rather from a 
view of the individual’s size compared with much larger contributors. 
Powerlessness was specifically focused upon by questioning how individuals would react 
if they could know for certain that taking a particular course of action would result in some 
lessening of climate change.  Responses across all groups were very similar on this.  If they could 
know for sure that their contribution would make a difference then they would be greatly 
encouraged to take action.  This suggests that individuals do take into account perceptions of 
personal efficacy when decision making.   
Responses across the focus groups indicate that while not either a crucial or well 
recognized reason for inaction, the perception of being powerless to affect climate change is 
present amongst the public.  The perception of powerlessness appears to be due to beliefs that 
actions an individual can take are too small to make a tangible difference. They are considered to 
be too small largely because of perceptions they are dwarfed by the actions of much larger 
contributors, e.g. China, rather than the actual size of climate change as a problem e.g. rising sea 
levels. 
8.1.3 Commons Dilemma 
 When discussing voluntary schemes to mitigate climate change two participants believed 
that parts of society (a majority according to one and minority according to the other) would fail 
to take part in any such scheme.  This shows some recognition of free-riding as a problem that 
undermines the provision of a public good, making individuals powerless to achieve an outcome.  
When asked explicitly how they would react to free-riding some participants indicated that they 
would continue to contribute whilst others stated they would contribute less or consider not 
contributing at all. 
 These results suggest that the commons dilemma is an issue that the public considers to be 
important when dealing with climate change.  A majority of participants who answered a 
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hypothetical question on free-riding stated that they would still continue to contribute in the 
presence of free-riding.  This should not be taken to mean that most in the wider public will act in 
this manner.  As already noted focus groups are not representative of the whole population due to 
self selection.  Furthermore responses to this hypothetical answer were neither anonymous nor 
ongoing over a long or indefinite period of time, both factors known to decrease contributions 
(Fox & Guyer, 1978; Isaac et al., 1985).  
 The commons dilemma is a factor recognized by some in the public as an important part 
of considerations about contributing to climate change mitigation.  While many focus group 
participants did not find the commons dilemma crucial to a hypothetical contribution this result 
cannot be taken as conclusive due to the inherent limitations of focus group data collection. 
8.2 Survey Results 
8.2.1 Ratings 
The average ratings of factors measured with questions 7 – 20 in the survey (on possible 
reasons for inaction) provide an interesting set of findings (see Table 5).  That the Availability of 
Options should be rated as the most influential item in determining behaviour is a notable finding.  
A high rating of this item indicates that individuals feel their choices are to a significant extent 
constrained by the options open to them. This finding is similar to the statements of individuals 
during focus groups undertaken for this research and by others (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  The 
reason why this factor is considered so important may be twofold.  First, if options for change are 
genuinely not available, then the rating of this item will logically indicate that option availability 
is very influential.  But based upon existing evidence there are likely to be more complex reasons 
behind the high rating of this option. It has been found that individuals justify commons dilemma 
defections by labelling themselves powerless to affect an outcome even when the contrary is true 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997).  This is particularly prevalent when confusion about either 
the issue or expected response occurs (Weber et al., 2004). At this point it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between powerlessness as used by Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland (1997) and that 
measured by the item Availability of Options.  In the research by Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland 
(1997) powerlessness refers to [its occurrence in the form of] low personal efficacy as used in 
Stern’s (2000) Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of behaviour.  That is, individuals may define 
themselves as powerless to have any effect upon a desired outcome.   In contrast, the item 
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Availability of Options is a measure of powerlessness in the sense of Ajzen’s (1991) theory of 
planned behaviour, i.e. powerlessness to choose a desired option for reasons beyond the 
individual’s control.  Research by Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland (1997) did not examine whether 
this form of powerlessness is used to justify inaction in a commons dilemma.  This suggestion 
cannot yet be empirically supported, but it does seem plausible that powerlessness in regard to 
perceived behavioural control is also given as a reason for defection in commons dilemmas when 
confusion regarding the situation is high.   
This response to confusion also fits with behaviour regarding norm confusion predicted 
by Schwartz and Howard’s (1981) theory of normative decision making. According to this model, 
individuals respond to norm confusion that results in inaction by, among other responses, 
denying their personal ability to make a change. If a process is occurring whereby individuals 
justify inaction by denying the ability to make a change then a high rating of Availability of 
Options is likely even when options are in actual fact available.  Several lines of evidence in the 
current findings back this up.  Firstly, those who rated Confusion highly were slightly more likely 
to also rate Availability of Options highly.  This finding supports the comparison with Schwartz 
and Howard’s (1981) norm confusion model.  Secondly, those who rated Availability of Options 
highly were moderately more likely to also rate Monetary Cost of Changing Actions highly 
(r=0.46***).  If monetary costs are considered to be preventing change, then that means that 
there are options for change open to the individual.  Thus the availability of options would have a 
low influence rating because options for change do exist, albeit that they are too expensive.  This 
would result in a negative correlation between the two items, the opposite of what is observed 
here.  Finally, despite the importance placed upon Availability of Options as a factor limiting 
behavioural change, those who rate it highly are more likely to have taken action on climate 
change and consider climate change more important in their actions.  
Evidence from this research supports a hypothesis that individuals respond to commons 
dilemmas by feeling unable make a change at the individual level.  This may account for some of 
the perceived importance of availability of options both within focus groups and the survey. 
Due to their conceptual similarities, the second and third highest rated variables, 
Uncertainty about the best option for change and Lack of knowledge about possible changes, 
were grouped together as the composite variable Option Uncertainty (see Table 7). From a 
logical point of view one might not expect a high rating for Option Uncertainty.  For one, 
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delaying a decision until the best option is known is counter to actually achieving the desired 
result.  If one is interested in reducing one’s contribution to climate change then any option which 
has a positive effect, even if not the best, is still worth considering.  Waiting for better 
information about the best option and remaining with the status quo does not lead to any 
reduction in one’s contribution to climate change.  A second consideration is that given the 
amount of information available to individuals on options for change either passively (e.g. 
billboards) or actively (e.g. a search on the internet), it seems implausible that individuals could 
have little or no knowledge of possible ways they might take actions, at least in any such levels 
that would lead this to be rated one of the most influential reasons in deciding their actions. 
8.3 Powerlessness Findings from Questionnaire 
Despite Powerlessness showing a weak correlation with Taking Action (see Table 8) there 
is no relationship apparent when regression analysis is conducted (see Table 8).  This suggests 
that any effect of powerlessness is secondary to one or more of Risk and Human Influence, 
Commons Dilemma or Income.  The dominant, overshadowing effect of powerlessness on taking 
action is likely to be Commons Dilemma, on the basis of the moderate correlation (r= 0.62***) 
between Commons Dilemma and Powerlessness.  Confirming this, removal of the Commons 
Dilemma variable from the regression analysis led to Powerlessness becoming a significant 
predictor of having taken action on climate change (β= -0.18*).  Removal of the other significant 
explanatory variables and inclusion of Commons Dilemma led only to insignificant findings for 
the importance of Powerlessness with regard to having taken action.  
The correlations between Powerlessness and other variables (see Table 8) suggest that 
though it may be seen as influential in individuals behaviour to reduce climate change, it is 
neither a large nor important factor in determining whether individuals have taken action.  
However this conclusion may mask the important role of Powerlessness. It is the only factor 
found to be associated with a lower level of Importance of Climate Change in Actions (see Table 
10); in combination these findings suggests that although individuals are no more or less likely to 
have taken action on climate change if they feel powerless (see Table 9), the more powerless an 
individual feels the less likely they are to consider climate change an important factor when 
changing their behaviour.  In effect, other reasons for changing behaviour eclipse climate change 
as a motivator. 
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A relationship between Uncertainty about the significance of climate change and 
Powerlessness was predicted, though not its strength.  It is in line with theory (Anderson, 2003; 
Schwartz & Howard, 1981) and findings by other researchers (Kaplan, 2000) that suggested that 
uncertainty and incomplete information lead to indecision and also, indirectly to powerlessness. 
The relationship between How informed and Powerlessness (see Table 11), indicating that 
those who feel less informed about climate change are more likely to feel powerless is expected 
based upon the results of Haller and Hadler (2008).  The results of Haller and Hadler (2008) 
showed a similar relationship between general environmental knowledge and powerlessness.  The 
results in this study relating to How Informed are also consistent with the Option Uncertainty 
results.  Both variables relate to Powerlessness in such a way as to suggest that increased 
knowledge about climate change in general and options for taking action reduce powerlessness. 
8.4 Powerlessness and the Commons Dilemma 
Those who rate the Commons Dilemma items as highly influential on their actions are 
much more likely to also rate Powerlessness highly (see Table 12).  Predictions about the 
closeness of the relationship between Commons Dilemma and Powerlessness were not made but 
its presence is consistent with findings from the literature showing a relationship between these 
two perceptions.  Based on that literature a possible explanation can be proposed.  The 
consideration of the actions of others has been found to be of importance when individuals are 
deciding upon contributions in resource allocation commons dilemmas (Wade-Benzoni et al., 
1996).   In such situations the commons dilemma nature of the problem acts to make people 
believe their contribution will be ineffective at achieving change because others will not 
contribute to a solution.   Evidence to support this was found during the focus group research 
conducted both for this research and by others (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Participants 
perceived an inability to achieve a desired outcome through voluntary or individual actions 
because of the failure of others to carry out similar actions.   
8.5 Commons Dilemma 
While not showing the strongest correlation with Taking Action found in this study, 
Commons Dilemma does show the strongest negative relationship.  This supports the hypothesis 
that the commons dilemma is associated with lowered action on climate change.  As the strongest 
negative association with Taking Action it is of particular interest for any campaigns aiming to 
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alter climate change related behaviour. Addressing this issue in an effort to minimise likely 
barriers to change that individual’s face, will be of importance. 
A correlation between Commons Dilemma and Uncertainty about the significance of 
climate change was expected based on the review of literature (Biel & Gärling, 1995; 
Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006).  Review of the literature had not led to any predictions regarding a 
relationship between Commons Dilemma and Option Uncertainty.  However, if the rating of 
Option Uncertainty serves as a proxy for degree of confusion on the matter, as is suggested in 
Section 8.8 then the correlation between Option Uncertainty and Commons Dilemma is to be 
expected based upon the relationship between confusion and the commons dilemma.  In 
commons dilemmas individuals are less likely to contribute when confusion is high.  This is due 
to the uncertainty about both the expected response and the response of others that this leads to.  
Thus the commons dilemma would be considered more highly by those who feel confusion about 
the issue of climate change. 
 
8.6 Perceived Risk 
Perceived Risk is found to have the strongest relationship with Action Taken of any 
variable (see Table 8).  Bord et al. (2000) and Haller and Hadler (2008) have found a similar 
correlation, giving perceived risk an important relationship with taking action.  This relation is 
also consistent with Stern’s (2000) Values-Beliefs-Norms framework of environmental behaviour.  
According to this model, evaluations of risk and threats to valued items form an important step in 
a framework predicting environmental behaviour.  A high rating of Perceived Risk is therefore in 
line with previous research on risk and behaviour (Haller & Hadler, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006).   
The correlation between ratings of Perceived Risk (considerations of severity and urgency 
of the problem of climate change) and Human influence on climate change was the strongest of 
any found in the survey (r=0.72***).  The strength of this finding is interesting for it is possible 
that an individual might hold the opinion that climate change is entirely natural in origin and still 
think it a large risk or see climate change as human induced and a small risk.  The strong 
correlation indicates that either of those options is uncommon.  This may represent some degree 
of conflation of the two variables on the part of individuals.  It might also be related to 
individuals attempting to deny the riskiness of climate change and rationalising this on the 
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grounds that climate change is not a matter of human influence.  Conversely others may see 
climate change as risky and human driven. 
This finding is an interesting and unexpectedly clear finding.  Previous study on the 
subject by Kellstedt et al. (2008) found that when individuals had greater confidence in the 
science of climate change they felt less responsible for the problem and subsequently rated the 
risk lower.  Although the rating of Human influence on climate change in the present study is not 
entirely interchangeable with the rating of certainty in the science used by Kellstedt et al. (2008), 
it is broadly comparable.  These authors measured how much trust individuals placed in scientists 
who gave information about climate change.  It is likely that information from scientists is in line 
with scientific literature on the causes of climate change, in which a consensus about the 
anthropogenic cause of current climate change exists (Oreskes, 2004). Therefore individuals who 
trust information from scientists would be expected to also rate the human influence on climate 
change, the variable used in the present study, highly.  In order to explain the difference between 
the conflicting results of this study and those of Kellstedt et al. (2008) it would be of interest to 
examine the quality of information possessed by individuals in both studies.  This is particularly 
true given that the study by Kellstedt et al. (2008) took place in the United States, a country with 
a highly active climate change ‘denial’ industry (Jacques et al., 2008) and below average 
knowledge of climate change when compared to the rest of the industrialised world (Brechin, 
2003).  These factors increase the likelihood that those participating in the study by Kellstedt et al. 
(2008) possess incorrect information on climate change.   
In the present study a high rating of the human influence on climate change should 
indicate greater confidence in the science and also possibly some sense of responsibility for the 
problem.  Thus if the relationship shown by Kellstedt et al. (2008) was to be reflected in the 
present study, it would be expected that the correlation between Human influence on climate 
change and Perceived Risk (even if different in strength to that of Kellstedt et al. (2008)) would 
still be negative, this is completely different to the actual results (r=0.72***).  Logically, it is 
plausible that individuals with greater knowledge of the science of climate change also consider 
the risks higher if the impression given from their information sources is that of a comparatively 
severe problem. 
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8.7 How Informed 
Ratings of How Informed participants consider themselves to be provided a set of 
correlations with other variables that was similar to findings from the literature.  A higher rating 
of the risks associated with environmental problems has been observed when knowledge of the 
environment is higher (Haller & Hadler, 2008).  The research by Haller and Hadler examined 
general environmental risks as opposed to specific ones.  The results of this survey provide 
support for the hypothesis that climate change is affected in a similar manner. 
Of importance is the relationship between rating of How Informed participants feel and 
Taking Action.  Fundamental to the operation of the knowledge deficit model underlying many 
climate change communications (Barr & Gilg, 2007; Barr et al., 2001; Kellstedt et al., 2008) is 
the belief that greater knowledge will lead to greater action.  However the correlation found is 
weak, suggesting that greater knowledge is not an important factor when deciding whether action 
is taken on climate change.  On the other hand it is not a strong negative correlation, thus there is 
no reason to think that better informed people are less likely to have taken action on climate 
change.  
 
8.8 Other Findings 
Based on the high rating given to Option Uncertainty, one might expect high Option 
Uncertainty to be negatively and at least moderately associated with action.  However no 
relationship is found in the correlations or regression analysis.  This appears to contradict the 
rating given to the item.  Possible explanations for this include: either people are inconsistent, 
saying that Option Uncertainty is important but not necessarily taking no action or Option 
Uncertainty is a barrier but not one that might be considered ‘fatal’ to taking action. 
Option Uncertainty is a rating of how incomplete individuals consider their information 
about potential changes they might make to their behaviour.  An interpretation arising from the 
literature review for this research is that when individuals feel they have incomplete information, 
it is a result of confusion surrounding the issue, not necessarily an actual lack of information 
(Anderson, 2003; Haller & Hadler, 2008).  This interpretation would also imply that they will 
show higher levels of powerlessness than those who feel they have more complete information 
(Haller & Hadler, 2008).   It is therefore worthwhile examining the possibility that Option 
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Uncertainty represents individuals’ rating of how confused or uncertain they are about the entire 
issue of climate change as opposed to just the possible options for change.   
If the rating of Option Uncertainty represents confusion about climate change then a 
negative correlation with the rating of How Informed and positive correlations with the ratings of 
Powerlessness and Commons Dilemma would be expected.  If this is not the case and it does 
represent uncertainty about possible options, then a negative correlation with Taking Action is 
expected.  All of the first three conditions are met: the correlations with rating of How Informed, 
Powerlessness and Commons Dilemma are as expected.  The fourth condition is also met, in that 
no significant correlation between Option Uncertainty and Taking Action is found.  These results, 
along with theory suggesting confusion will be high surrounding an issue such as climate change 
(Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006), support the suggestion that Option Uncertainty is a proxy for 
confusion on the issue of climate change.  More research into this area is necessary in order to be 
able to draw a strong conclusion about a possible relationship between the two variables. 
 It is of interest, for it is apparently counter intuitive, that the rating of the influence of 
Option Difficulty (cost, inconvenience, availability and fitting in with others) has a positive 
correlation with Taking action.  One interpretation of this would be that the harder people find it 
to change the more likely they are to do so.  On the face of it, this appears illogical. However 
another explanation provides a more satisfactory answer.  Individuals who have taken action are 
more likely to have come across the barriers to change encompassed by the variable Option 
Difficulty than those who have not;  i.e. not until beginning to take some action do the barriers 
such as cost become apparent.  Those who take no action are less aware of difficulty barriers and 
instead consider the various perceptions covered by other questions to be of greater importance 
 
8.9. Socio-demographic Factors 
 The relationship of socio-demographics with the various factors important to this study 
has been found to be small; only age and income showed any statistically significant relationships.  
This general finding of few relationships with socio-demographics was expected following the 
review of the literature.  Stern’s (2000) Values-Beliefs-Norms model does not include any such 
factors as significant, at least directly.  Nor did the review of current understanding of perceptions 
of powerlessness and the commons dilemma indicate that socio-demographic factors would be 
important.  Haller and Hadler (2008) found socio-demographic factors to be of minor importance 
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when predicting powerlessness. These may be briefly summarised as those who were younger, 
better educated, richer or female were slightly less powerless.  Kellstedt et al. (2008) however 
found statistically significant results only for age.  These contrasted with the results of Haller and 
Hadler (2008) by finding that older individuals were less likely to feel powerless. The results of 
the present study support the finding by Kellstedt et al. (2008), showing that socio-demographics 
are of minor importance when predicting perceptions of powerlessness and the commons 
dilemma.  
 The relationship of income with Taking Action is of interest.  The results show that those 
with higher incomes were slightly less likely to have taken action on climate change.  It is likely 
that those with higher incomes would have a greater ability to choose environmentally friendly 
alternatives that might cost more. Instead this finding suggests that individuals do not take actions 
that would have a negative impact on climate change e.g. an international flight, due to cost 
constraints but afterwards claim that the reason or at least part of the reason that action was not 
taken was concern about climate change. 
8.10 Results within the Values-Beliefs-Norms Framework 
The findings from this research are consistent with the framework of environmental 
behaviour described by the Values-Beliefs-Norms (VBN) model (Stern, 2000).   
 
Figure 9 Values Beliefs Norms model of environmental behaviour. Adapted from Stern (2005) 
 
According to the VBN model, what might be termed a ‘rational’ cost-benefit analysis or 
examination of applicable factors is not important in determining actual pro-environmental 
behaviour.  In the present results, Option Difficulty, i.e. those factors with tangible considerations 
such as cost in time or money which would constitute a significant part of a ‘rational’ analysis, is 
not found to have a significant level of predictive power regarding taking action (β=0.12). This 
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finding supports their omission from the VBN model.  However, positive support for this model 
of behaviour comes from the ratings of perceived risk, human influence on climate change, 
powerlessness and the commons dilemma. Each of these factors was rated as important relating 
to one or both of the two action variables measured with survey Questions 5 and 6.  Each of these 
corresponds to one of the beliefs present at Steps 2a – c above.   Together they encompass all the 
steps. Perceived Risk is contained within Step 2b, adverse consequences for valued objects, of the 
model.  An ecological worldview, Step 2a, is shaped by a number of factors.  One important 
factor is a belief in interconnections between human activities and the natural environment 
(Dunlap et al., 1992).   An individual’s rating of human influence on climate change therefore 
provides some indication how strongly they consider human activities and the environment to be 
connected.  For this reason the association between both action variables and the rating of human 
influence on climate change is consistent with the VBN model.  Powerlessness and the commons 
dilemma are contained within Step 2c.  The relatively high correlation of these items with taking 
action supports their inclusion as key factors in the VBN model.   
The purpose of this research was not to comprehensively assess the validity of the VBN 
model of environmental behaviour; therefore values and norms were not examined.    
8.11 Limitations of this Research 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations.  Results of the focus groups 
cannot be taken to be representative of the wider population of New Zealand or even Wellington.  
This is due to the self-selecting sample that takes part in the focus groups.  There is a tendency 
for those who participate to have strong opinions about the topic, a particular interest in it or 
simply take part for the reward.  The survey is also subject to similar limitations. Constraints 
meant that the survey area was limited to three locations within the Wellington region and around 
200 participants.  There are two important limitations regarding this constraint that must therefore 
be noted.   
Firstly, because only one region, within one country was surveyed the potential for 
population variation to give differing results in other regions must be recognised.  Other surveys 
have found differences in environmental values to be significant even within comparatively 
similar wealthy, liberal Western democracies (Harrison et al., 1996).  These differences are even 
more pronounced between regions with strongly differing wealth and political structures (Haller 
& Hadler, 2008). 
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Secondly, the socio-demographics of the group (see Table 3) show that the sample differs 
significantly even from the general New Zealand population.  The most notable differences in 
socio-demographics between the sample group and the wider population of New Zealand concern 
income and education.  The survey group had higher levels of both education and income than 
the wider population.  The ages of those in the survey sample were also clustered around middle 
age bands with smaller proportions over 60 or under 20 years of age.   
The effect that any of these differences would have upon the data gathered via the survey 
is unknown.  It is possible, for example, that the proportion reporting having taken action (70%) 
is higher in the sample than would be the case for the New Zealand population as a whole.  Thus 
these results may not necessarily reflect opinions and/or associations that are present within the 
wider population of either New Zealand or other locations in the world. 
Separate from socio-demographic or representational concerns, it must also be noted that 
the questionnaire was elicited self assessment.  In particular, regarding questions about actions 
(Question 5 and 6) the limitation must be noted that the answers given may more accurately 
reflect intentions than actual behaviours, a finding already cited by other researchers (Stern, 
1992).   
8.12 Directions for Further Research 
 Results of this study indicate several lines of interest for further research.  
 
Confusion surrounding climate change – The results of this research indicate that confusion 
has an important relationship with perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma.  This 
finding is supported by evidence from the literature review.  Following on from this finding there 
are several questions of interest to furthering understanding of confusion and climate change: 
What are the main causes of confusion? Reasons for confusion are likely to centre on 
conflicting information, the response of others and characteristics inherent to climate 
change.  This study was not intended to determine causes of confusion. 
How does confusion relate to perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma?  
A relationship between these two variables was found but due to the nature of this 
research a causal link could not be established. Based on the literature review it is 
expected that individuals respond to confusion by labelling themselves powerless.  
Research to either confirm or challenge this would be of interest. 
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The importance of unavailability of options for change – This factor was consistently given as 
the most important factor constraining individuals from taking further action on climate change 
during focus groups and in surveys.  This contrasts with the low importance of the item found via 
regression analysis.  This suggests that individuals justify inaction by denying the ability to take 
action when in fact other reasons are instead compelling. This is a phenomenon that fits with 
Schwartz and Howard’s (1981) model of behaviour regarding conflicting norms.  Investigating if 
and why this occurs regarding environmental behaviour would be of interest to encouraging 
behavioural change. 
 
The importance of climate change in behaviours – Much behaviour that can be considered to 
be reducing contributions to climate change also has co-benefits such as savings in money.  
These co-benefits could easily overshadow any concerns individuals have regarding climate 
change, these concerns might even be non-existent.  Having changed behaviour individuals might 
then rate climate change as an important factor.  Such behaviour may or may not be intentional. It 
means that self reported behaviours might be inaccurate at finding actual causes and levels of 
change.  It would therefore be of interest to investigate the relative importance of climate change 
versus co-benefits in motivating behavioural change. 
 
Perceptions as important first barrier to change – The results from the survey suggest that 
those who consider cost and other barriers important are more likely to have taken action.  This 
finding seems counter intuitive.  A possible explanation is that individuals do not consider the 
barriers such as cost until during and after taking action.  The implication of this is that 
perceptions such as powerlessness initially prevent change.  Not until some change is made or 
attempted do other barriers become apparent.  Investigating whether this interpretation is true will 
be of importance to behaviour change campaigns for it implies that addressing perceptions is an 
important first step towards encouraging behaviour change. 
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9 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to evaluate perceptions of powerlessness and the commons 
dilemma in relation to individual action on climate change.  Both of these perceptions can act as 
psychological barriers to change. Therefore an improved understanding of the factors associated 
with perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma and importance of each barrier 
may enable campaigns aiming to encourage pro-environmental behaviour to address them.  This 
is especially important in light of recent research suggesting that one of the most common 
methods of encouraging pro-environmental behaviour may actually strengthen psychological 
barriers, in particular powerlessness (Kellstedt et al., 2008).   
Mixed method research was conducted in order to gather both qualitative and quantitative 
data.  Financial and time constraints limited the location of the study to the Wellington region.  
Focus groups allowed for active discussion of the topics and informed the design of a 
questionnaire to collect quantitative data for statistical analysis. 
Within the focus groups individuals showed a tendency to simplify issues relevant to what 
was perceived as the single most important component.  This indicated incomplete understanding 
of the climate change issue; attribution of blame for climate change to large single entities and a 
general failure to separate climate change from other environmental problems such as ozone 
depletion or low hydro electricity lake levels.  This confusion occurred both in terms of 
understanding the causes and possible solutions to climate change.  When participants were asked 
why individual action was not taken on climate change the most important reason given was the 
perceived lack of options for change available.  When questioned more directly, both 
powerlessness and the commons dilemma were found to have been given some consideration.  
Powerlessness appeared to be more widespread and considered in greater detail than the 
commons dilemma. Powerlessness appeared to be most prominent in relation to the individual’s 
size compared to other large contributors to climate change, e.g. China, rather than catastrophic 
effects e.g. sea level rise. Most participants appeared not to have considered climate change and 
possible responses to it either in detail or separate from general action to ‘save the environment’.  
The responses given showed similarity with those found by other researchers who have 
conducted focus groups on the same topic (Futerra, 2004; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). 
Questionnaire data indicated that individuals consider that availability of options is the 
most important constraining factor in terms of individual action on climate change.  But when the 
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data were examined with correlations and regression analysis a different picture emerged.  The 
availability of options and other factors, such as the cost of taking action were found to be, at best, 
weak predictors of whether individuals took action to reduce climate change.  Counter-intuitively 
those rating cost highly were more likely to have taken action than those rating it lower. 
The survey results suggest that the perceptions of individuals about the commons 
dilemma and powerlessness regarding climate change are important at different stages of taking 
action on climate change.  The commons dilemma is important when initially taking action whilst 
powerlessness affects the importance placed upon climate change in actions taken.  The counter-
intuitive rating of cost and the ratings of powerlessness and the commons dilemma raises an 
interesting hypothesis.  Individuals make initial decisions based upon perceptions such as 
powerlessness rather than more practical considerations such as cost.  Not until individuals are 
taking action are they shaped by those practical considerations.  
The findings of this research support the hypotheses that heightened perceptions of 
powerlessness and the commons dilemma are associated with lower levels of action on climate 
change i.e. those who rate powerlessness and the common dilemma highly are less likely to take 
action and if they do, they are more likely to consider climate change less important in their 
actions.  The hypothesis that a heightened sense of risk about climate change is associated with 
raised levels of powerlessness and a lower level of action is challenged.  The findings of this 
study indicate that the opposite is true.  Those who consider the risks of climate change to be high 
are less likely to consider themselves powerless and more likely to take action.  The hypotheses 
that a high level of information on climate change is associated with lesser perceptions of climate 
change risk and high perceptions of powerlessness are challenged too.  This study found that 
those who considered themselves more informed are more likely to rate climate change as riskier, 
more likely to see it as an urgent issue and feel less powerless regarding their ability to mitigate it. 
In combination the findings show that stronger perceptions of powerlessness and the 
commons dilemma are associated with lower levels of action regarding climate change.  The 
perceived risk of climate change and the perceived level of human influence on climate change 
are however the factors most strongly predictive of having taken action.  The findings of this 
research generally provide support for the knowledge-deficit model of behaviour change. 
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Appendix 1– Focus Group Documents 
Focus Group Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Focus Group Participants 
 
Christopher Aitken Ralph Chapman John McClure  
MEnvStud Student Associate Professor Associate Professor 
aitkenchri@student.vuw.ac.nz ralph.chapman@vuw.ac.nz john.mcclure@vuw.ac.nz 
  463-6047 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
• This research will enable us to examine the role of powerlessness in influencing people’s actions 
about climate change 
Who is conducting the research? 
• Christopher Aitken in the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences.  Supervised by 
Associate Professor Ralph Chapman of the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences 
and Associate Professor John McClure of the School of Psychology. This research has been approved 
by the University ethics committee 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
• If you agree to participate in this focus group, you will be asked to elaborate upon and provide 
opinions on various points and statements relating to the theme of this research. 
• We anticipate that your total involvement will take approximately an hour. 
• During the research you are free to withdraw, without any penalty, at any point before the focus group 
session has commenced. 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We may keep data collected through this focus groups for up to five years 
• You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The 
information you provide will be coded by number only. 
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded and 
confidential data we collect may be shared with other competent researchers. 
• Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
• A copy of the coded and confidential data will remain in the custody of Christopher Aitken for up to 
five years 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
• The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific 
conferences. 
• The overall findings may form part of a Masters thesis that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact me (Christopher Aitken) at the above 
contact address. 
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Focus Group Consent Form 
 
Statement of consent for participation in focus group research 
 
I have read the information about this research and any questions I wanted to ask have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I am aware of and understand that: 
-  This research is for the completion of a Masters of Environmental Studies 
degree at Victoria University of Wellington 
- Data from this research may be kept up to 5 years 
- All data will be confidential, coded and kept secure 
- Data may be released to other researchers upon request 
 
I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any time, 
without penalty, prior to the commencement of discussion.  
 
 
Name:  __________________________________ 
 
 
Signature:  __________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  __________________________________ 
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Appendix 2– Questionnaire Documents 
Questionnaire Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Survey Participants 
 
Christopher Aitken Ralph Chapman John McClure  
MEnvStud Student Associate Professor Associate Professor 
aitkenchri@student.vuw.ac.nz ralph.chapman@vuw.ac.nz john.mcclure@vuw.ac.nz 
  463-6047 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
• This research will enable us to examine the role of powerlessness in influencing people’s actions 
about climate change 
Who is conducting the research? 
• Christopher Aitken in the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences.  Supervised by 
Associate Professor Ralph Chapman of the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences 
and Associate Professor John McClure of the School of Psychology. This research has been approved 
by the University ethics committee 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
• If you agree to participate in this study you will fill out a short questionnaire where you give your 
ratings of considerations about possible action on climate change 
• We anticipate that your total involvement will take no more than 5 minutes. 
• During the research you are free to withdraw, without any penalty, at any point before your data have 
been collected. 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We may keep data collected through this survey for up to five years 
• You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The 
information you provide will be coded by number only. 
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded and 
anonymous data we collect may be shared with other competent researchers. 
• Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
• A copy of the coded and anonymous data will remain in the custody of Christopher Aitken for up to 
five years 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
• The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific 
conferences. 
• The overall findings may form part of a Masters thesis that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact me (Christopher Aitken) at the above 
contact address. 
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Questionnaire 
 
 
Introduction 
Climate change which includes global warming is widely seen as a significant issue today.  We 
are often asked to make changes in our lives that will lessen climate change.  However there may 
be reasons leading us to choose not to make changes.  This questionnaire asks about your views 
on these choices. 
Completion of this survey indicates consent for data from the questionnaire to be included in 
analysis. 
 
For all questions except question 5 please mark with an X on the line to indicate your opinion. 
 
1. How well informed do you consider yourself on the issue of climate change?  
     
   Not informed                               Moderately informed                        Very well informed 
         1                   2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
2. To what extent do you believe human activity is contributing to climate change? 
 
   Not at all                                                                                                               A lot 
         1                   2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
3. How severe do you consider the problem of climate change? 
 
    Not a problem                        Somewhat of a problem                            A huge problem 
         1                   2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
4. How soon should climate change be dealt with? 
 
     Never                                               In the future                                        Immediately   
         1                   2             3                   4              5 
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5. Have you changed your actions, at least partly, due to consideration of climate change?  
Yes/No (Circle One)      If you answer No please go to question 7. 
 
6.  How much has climate change been a factor in changing your actions?  
     A minor factor                                                                                             A major factor 
          1                  2             3                   4                        5 
 
 
How influential have the following factors been in shaping your own decisions about actions 
that might affect climate change? 
 
7. The monetary cost of changing my actions 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4                        5 
 
 
8. The availability of options for change 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4                        5 
 
 
9. The inconvenience of options for change 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
10. Fitting changes in with family and others  
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
11. Lack of knowledge about possible changes I can make 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
12. Uncertainty about the best option to contribute to reducing climate change 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
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How influential have the following factors been in shaping your own decisions about actions 
that might affect climate change? 
13. Uncertainty as to whether climate change is a significant problem 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
14. The feeling that climate change is too big for my actions to have an impact 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
15. The feeling that my actions will not affect the outcome of climate change 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
16. The feeling that my contribution is just a drop in the ocean and so is insignificant 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
17. Feeling that other individuals will not change their actions even if I do 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
18. Unfairness associated with bearing the cost of change whilst others do not  
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
 
19. Other countries or people not taking equivalent action currently 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
 
 
20. Looking foolish due to being the only one to change actions 
Not influential                                                               Very influential 
          1                  2             3                   4              5 
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21.  Please indicate your age and gender 
 
Under 20 
20 – 29 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60+ 
 
Male/Female 
 
22. What is your highest level of education? 
No Qualification  __ 
High School Qualification   __ 
Tertiary Degree  __ 
Tertiary Other  __ 
 
23. If you don’t mind, please indicate your individual income? 
$0 - $25,000 __ 
$25,001 - $50,000 __ 
$50,001 - $75,000 __ 
$75,001+ __ 
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